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This dissertation examines the impact mandated vertical restraints have on market
outcomes using the US brewing industry. In particular, I examine the impact of beer
franchise laws, which restrict when a brewer can end a contract with a wholesaler, mandated
exclusive territories which require a brewer to grant a geographic region to a wholesaler
in which no other wholesaler is allowed to sell the contracted brands, and divorcement
of brewers and wholesalers, which are laws that prohibit brewers from wholesaling their
products to retailers. The first chapter explains the industry and these restraints in detail.
The second chapter examines the impact of franchise termination laws, mandated
exclusive territories, and prohibitions of vertical integration between brewers and whole-
salers on the entry and production decisions of craft brewers in the US beer market. I
identify the effects by exploiting variation in policies across states and time between 1984
and 2013. I estimate that franchise termination laws significantly reduced net brewery en-
try and craft beer production. The impact is larger in states that prohibit self-distribution
by brewers. Mandated exclusive territories reduced brewery entry as well, though the es-
timates are not statistically significant in all specifications and are estimated to have very
little effects on production. Lastly, allowing vertical integration between brewers and whole-
salers accounts for 60-78% of the difference in the number of breweries between states that
prohibit integration and led to 178-251% more craft beer production.
The final chapter examines a case study of the effect on price and quantity of law
changes regarding vertical restraints in the beer industry. In May of 2004, Wisconsin enacted
beer franchise laws which legally restricted when a brewer could terminate a contract with
ii
a beer wholesaler. Subsequently in January of 2006, Wisconsin mandated that brewers
must assign each wholesaler to an exclusive wholesale territory. Using scanner data from
a large number of chain grocery stores, I examine the impact of these laws on prices and
quantities sold. The impacts differ depending on whether the brewery is a large, domestic
brewery, import brewery, smaller craft brewery or located in-state. I find that craft beer
prices increased by approximately 2.34-3.40% after franchise laws were implemented and
increased 3.31-3.92% after exclusive territories were mandated. The latter effect was larger
for craft brewers located within Wisconsin. These results are robust and consistent across
several control groups. I do not find robust results, consistent across control groups, on
sales quantities. Using surrounding states as a control group, which may better account
for local shocks, finds overall beer quantity sold decreased. Results are consistent with the
laws causing an increase in costs of distribution and reducing competition.
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Chapter 1
Background of the Brewing
Industry and Vertical Restraints
The brewing industry in the United States is one characterized by heavy state and
federal regulation. Much of the state level regulation focuses on the vertical components
of the industry and limits how firms along the supply chain can interact. This dissertation
examines the impact of three of these so-called vertical restraints: prohibitions on brewers
acting as wholesalers (divorcement); beer franchise laws, which restrict when a brewer can
end a contract with a wholesaler, and mandated exclusive wholesale territories.
In addition to being heavily regulated, the brewing industry is also very concentrated
(Tremblay, Iwasaki, and Tremblay, 2005). Over the past 35 years however, a niche market
of “craft” brewers has emerged, and now captures a sizable portion of the industry. These
brewers are typically small enterprises compared to the national brewers that dominate the
market, but are regulated similarly in most states.1
To fully understand the implications of these restrictions in the beer industry, some
background about the policies being considered and the history and structure of the mar-
ket will be helpful. This chapter will discuss both specifics of the brewing industry and
1For more institutional details on the brewing industry and craft brewers, see Tremblay and Tremblay
(2005).
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theoretical considerations of the mandated VRs.
1.1 Three-Tier System
The “three-tier system,” as it is commonly referred to in the beer industry, was
implemented in most states following prohibition in alcoholic beverage industries. This
“three-tier” system places various levels of restrictions on the vertical components of the
brewing industry. This system of regulations was instituted to maintain independence
between manufacturing (1st tier), wholesaling or distributing (2nd tier), and retailing (3rd
tier). The details described here are specific to the brewing industry, though wine and
liquor industries have similar restrictions and is also referred to as a “three-tier system.”
Under this system, brewers manufacture the beer, sell it to wholesalers, who in turn sell to
retailers, who then sell to consumers. Figure 1.1 depicts a representation of the structure
of the brewing industry. All states have distinct licenses for all three tiers, and most do not
allow multiple tier’s licenses to be held by the same person, company, or interest.2
A motivating factor of this was the perceived abuses of the “tied-house” system,
common prior to prohibition, in which breweries were integrated vertically up to the retail
level and required bars and saloons to exclude purchases of other brands in order to purchase
from them.3 After prohibition ended, most states fought aggressively against this and
enacted a number of laws to prohibit this.4
While there is some amount of overlap allowed in some states between manufactur-
2Most breweries use the services of an independent wholesaler, so even when exceptions exist to the
common restrictions of complete independence between tiers, it is often still referred to as the “three-tier
system.”
3This arrangement is not uncommon outside the US. Slade (1998), for example, studies the effect of a
government ruling in 1989 mandating divestitures of many “tied-house” arrangements by brewers in the UK.
4A summary given by the California Supreme Court in California Beer Wholesalers Assn., Inc. v.
Alcoholic Bev. etc. Appeals Bd. (1971) 5 C3d 402 reads, “Following repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment,
the vast majority of states, including California, enacted alcoholic beverage control laws. These statutes
sought to forestall the generation of such evils and excesses as intemperance and disorderly marketing
conditions that had plagued the public and the alcoholic beverage industry prior to prohibition... By
enacting prohibitions against “tied-house” arrangements, state legislatures aimed to prevent two particular
dangers: the ability and potentiality of large firms to dominate local markets through vertical and horizontal
integration ... and the excessive sales of alcoholic beverages produced by the overly aggressive marketing
techniques of larger alcoholic beverage concerns.”
2
ing and wholesaling, no states permitted either brewers or beer wholesalers to also act as
retailers, with the recent exception of brewpubs,5 where a restaurant also has a brewery
operation on site, and in some states, direct shipping to consumers and on-brewery-premise
sales. With these exceptions, all states have continued to enforce prohibitions against tied-
house arrangements.
In addition to restrictions between retailers and other tiers, most states have strict
rules governing the relationship between wholesalers and manufacturers of beer. However,
there is variation among the states regarding the allowed level of vertical integration. Some
states, which I will define as “two-tier” states, had no bans on breweries distributing their
own beer, as allowed either by the brewery license or by allowing breweries to obtain a
separate wholesaler’s license in addition to the brewery license. Twenty states are here
categorized as “two-tier” and have allowed self-distribution over the entire sample of chapter
2’s study from 1984-2013.6
Many had laws passed directly after prohibition, and all states defined as “two-tier”
allowed self-distribution for in state breweries well before entry of craft brewers began.
The other states had strict prohibitions on individuals or firms owning both wholesale and
manufacturing permits or operating as both. These states allowed no overlap in ownership of
manufacturers, wholesalers, or retailers. Recently, however, states began passing exceptions
for small breweries. Typical laws define small brewers as those producing only so many
barrels, usually on the order of thousands to tens of thousands with a high variance across
states, and allow self-distribution only up to a limited number of barrels.7 Fourteen states
still have no exceptions for small breweries and require breweries to distribute through an
independent wholesaler. For a broader discussion of alcohol industry regulations and the
three-tier system including beer, wine, and liquor industries, see Whitman (2003).
5Washington was the first state to legalize brewpubs in 1982, and most followed shortly after. Mississippi
was the last state in 1999.
6These states are Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Iowa, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Ver-
mont, Washington, and Wisconsin. Kentucky until 2015 allowed out of state breweries to act as wholesalers,
but the permit for small breweries does not allow wholesaling activities by small breweries.
7A barrel of beer is equivalent to 31 gallons.
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1.2 Franchise Termination Laws
In the United States the relationship between franchisors and franchisees is governed
by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) at the federal level. Additionally, beginning in
the 1970s, many states passed laws governing the relationship between franchisors and
franchisees. These laws, to varying degrees across states, among other things, restrict when
franchisors or franchisees are able to terminate or fail to renew a contract. Although the
relationship between breweries and wholesalers are not necessarily a traditional franchise
in the common use of the term, some state level “traditional” franchise laws may apply
to these relationships in a limited extent.8 Many states, beginning around the same time
“traditional” franchise laws were passed also enacted so-called “beer franchise laws.” These
laws put legal restrictions on when a brewer is allowed to cancel, terminate, or fail to renew
a contract with wholesalers.
While only eighteen states have traditional franchise laws, almost all states as of
2013 have beer franchise laws. Kurtz and Clements (2014) present a useful overview of
the similarities and differences between traditional and beer franchise laws. Beer franchise
laws in name often encompass many different regulations, including mandated exclusive
territories. In this dissertation however, the variables constructed for franchise laws are
only those laws specifically requiring “good cause” (or similar terms) to terminate, cancel,
or fail to renew a contract between brewers and wholesalers in the brewing industry.9
8For example, in Wisconsin, prior to 2004, Wisconsin’s “Fair Dealership Law” governed termination
restrictions between wholesalers and brewers if the brand in the contract represented 15% of the wholesaler’s
business. This would cover only the largest brands. In 2004 the legislature passed Senate Bill 489 which
applied only specifically to brewers and beer wholesalers, restricting further the ability of brewers to terminate
contracts. On the other hand, California as Kurtz and Clements (2014) described defines a franchise when
“(1) the franchisee’s business is substantially associated with the franchisor’s trademark; (2) the franchisee
pays the franchisor a fee to engage in the business and use its trademark; and (3) the franchisee operates
the business under a marketing plan or system prescribed in substantial part by the franchisor.” Very few
brewery/wholesaler relationships are likely to fit this definition.
9Virginia’s Beer Franchise Act is representative of the type of restrictions these laws place on termination
of contracts. Virginia’s Code of statutes § 4.1-505 “Cancellation” reads, “Notwithstanding the terms, pro-
visions or conditions of any agreement, no brewery shall unilaterally amend, cancel, terminate or refuse to
continue to renew any agreement, or unilaterally cause a wholesaler to resign from an agreement, unless the
brewery has first complied with § 4.1-506 and good cause exists for amendment, termination, cancellation,
nonrenewal, noncontinuation or causing a resignation. Good cause shall not include the sale or purchase of
a brewery.”
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Good cause typically includes things that could be considered gross violations of
the agreed upon contract such as selling outside a designated sales territory, or blatant
disregard for the storage and shipment of the product that could lead to spoilage or other
quality problems. Further, most laws require that prior notice, commonly of 90 days, must
be given before termination or nonrenewal of a contract occurs. If the wholesaler corrects
the perceived grievance within that time period termination or nonrenewal is voided. The
burden of proof is often on the brewery to show any failure of meeting the agreed upon
terms and may be difficult to show.10
These beer franchise laws give protection to wholesalers from potential opportunistic
acts from brewers. As Blair and Lafontaine (2011) point out, franchisees (which would
correspond to wholesalers in the brewing industry) have often “complained that they do
not reap the benefit of their hard work because once they make a market profitable, the
franchisor behaves opportunistically and simply terminates or does not renew their contract.
The franchisor then presumably appropriates the profits of the outlet either by operating
the outlet directly, or by selling it to a new franchisee...” Given that common roles of beer
wholesalers are promotional activities and quality investment (keeping beer refrigerated,
unexposed to sunlight, and fresh, for example), this complaint could fit the brewing industry
as well. However, protections against terminations may also encourage opportunism from
wholesalers. If it becomes more costly to terminate a wholesaler, there will be less incentive
to undertake costly promotional and quality investment, and thus may harm upstream
brewers.
Several empirical studies have examined the impact of franchise laws outside the
brewing industry. For example, Smith II (1982) investigates the impact of VR in the au-
tomobile industry and finds that implementing franchise termination restrictions similar to
10Costly legal battles that the Brooklyn Brewery and the Dogfish Head Brewery have
had over disagreements with distributors are discussed in a NY Times Op-ed here:
www.nytimes.com/2014/03/30/opinion/sunday/free-craft-beer.html. This can be prohibitively costly
for many brewers and may prevent brewers from entering. Additionally, a more extreme response to
franchise laws, Bell’s Brewery pulled their entire line of beer out of the state of Illinois rather than deal with
franchise laws after a dispute with a distributor. See “Bell’s Brings Beer Back to Area.” Chicago Tribune,
August 1, 2008, www.articles.chicagotribune.com/2008-08-01/business/0807310746 1 brewers-association-
new-distributors-craft-brewer.
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those in the brewing industry increased the number of automobile dealerships, but man-
dated exclusive territories decreased this number. Brickley et. al (1991) find that the
passage of state franchise laws reduced the percentage of units franchised in non-repeat
customer industries and decreased stock prices of franchising firms. More recently, Klick
et. al (2012) examine the number of franchise contracts from selected fast food restaurants
and find that binding franchise termination laws significantly reduced franchising activi-
ties. This dissertation seeks to examine empirically the effects of beer franchise laws, and
finds support for the hypothesis that these laws encourage opportunism by wholesalers and
increase costs to brewers as these laws decreased craft brewery entry and production and
increased prices.
1.3 Exclusive Territories
Exclusive territorial agreements between manufacturers and wholesalers designate a
specific geographical area in which only one wholesaler may sell a specific brand produced
by the manufacturer. Exclusive wholesale territories are used voluntarily in many indus-
tries (Katz, 1978; Azoulay and Shane, 2001, e.g.), but 35 states mandate that brewers use
exclusive wholesale territories, with Georgia being the first to do so in 1965.11 Brewers,
especially large breweries, often employ the use of multiple wholesalers. In states that man-
date exclusive territories, this is allowed so long as there is no overlap in the geographical
areas in which the same brand is sold by two different wholesalers. Figure 1.2 depicts a
graphical representation of exclusive territories where one manufacturer sells to two whole-
salers, but the wholesalers are not selling to overlapping retailers. With the exception of
Indiana from 1979 to 2002, no states explicitly prohibited granting exclusive territories by
brewers to wholesalers.
11These states are Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hamp-
shire, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Utah and Okla-
homa are not counted as having exclusive territories in the regressions presented. This is since when Utah
passed in 2011, an exception was given for small brewers. Oklahoma’s 1993 law only applied to producers
of “low-point” beer below 3.2% alcohol by weight. Most craft beer is above this level.
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The theoretical impact of exclusive territories is ambiguous. While the voluntary use
of exclusive territories may serve to reduce competition (Rey and Stiglitz, 1995) or prevent
entry (Asker and Bar-Isaac 2014), it may also serve to align incentives between brewer and
wholesaler and prevent wholesalers from free-riding on the efforts of other wholesalers (Klein
and Murphy, 1988). Mandating that exclusive territories may alter either of these effects.
It may prevent anti-competitive uses which stemmed from threatening to end exclusive
contracts but the removal of this threat may alsoreduce welfare enhancing uses since it
could increase a wholesaler’s incentive to shirk on product investment.
Mandated exclusive territories have been examined empirically by several researchers
and almost all studies focus on price or quantity effects. Jordan and Jaffee (1987) and Cul-
bertson and Bradford (1991) are two early studies that find mandated exclusive territories
increase prices. They both conclude mandated exclusive territories decrease welfare. On
the other hand, in a series of studies, Sass and Saurman (1993, 2001) examine mandated ex-
clusive territories and find evidence that, although higher prices may result from exclusive
territories, price increases can be consistent with increasing welfare because beer quality
may have increased as well. They come to similar conclusions in a 1996 study where they
find Indiana’s ban of exclusive territories led to a decrease in consumption. More recently,
Rojas (2012) examined the impact that mandated exclusive territories had in Arkansas,
which began mandating exclusive territories in 1991.12 He finds that this increased brand
level sales significantly and had a small impact on price, and thus concludes that mandat-
ing exclusive territories, net of any externalities of alcohol consumption, was likely welfare
improving. Both Sass and Saurman (1993) and Rojas (2012) argued that these mandates
were valuable to brewers who would have not used exclusive territories without a mandate
for fear of litigation. During this earlier time period lawsuits were brought against brewers
for the use of exclusive territories.13 Since the positive findings are presumably a result
12Included in the same legislation that mandated exclusive territories, however, are beer franchise termi-
nation laws. Therefore it is not clear that exclusive territories is the policy effect being identified.
13See for example, Adolph Coors Co. v. FTC, 497 F.2d 1178 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1105 (1975). This is not likely the environment today, as the FTC recently has argued against implementing
beer franchise laws and mandating exclusive territories: Federal Trade Commission. (2005). Comment on
(California’s) Proposed Beer Franchise Act, August 24, available at www.ftc.gov
7
of being able to use exclusive territories without the cost of litigation, following Slade and
Lafontaine (2008), I consider these to be evidence for welfare increasing uses of voluntary
vertical restraints. This study is distinguished from these previous studies by focusing on
entry and production in a niche market rather than prices or total quantities of all products,




















Figure 1.1: Depiction of Brewing Industry Tiers
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Chapter 2
Impact of Mandated Vertical
Restraints on Craft Brewery Entry
and Production
2.1 Introduction
Over the past thirty five years, the United States has had an enormous growth in
the number of breweries. Figure 2.1 shows that the number of permitted breweries rose
from 42 in 1984 to nearly 4,000 in 2013; craft beer production levels have similarly risen.
This has almost entirely been driven by the enormous growth of the craft beer industry, or
as it is sometimes referred to in the economic literature, “specialty breweries.” This growth
has been seen across the entire country, and although demand for these products has grown
quite rapidly, some states have seen more breweries enter than others. This paper uses the
emergence of the craft beer industry to investigate the role mandated vertical restraints had
on upstream entry and production decisions.
The brewing industry has many features that make it useful for studying vertical
economic relationships, and particularly mandates of vertical restraints (VRs). After pro-
hibition ended on December 5, 1933, each state implemented its own regulatory policies
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on alcohol consumption and industrial behavior.1 This has yielded a variety of regulatory
policies across states, and individual states have also varied regulations over time. Much of
this regulation of the brewing industry concerns the relationship and allowable overlap of
manufacturers (brewers), wholesalers or distributors, and retailers. This so-called “three-
tier” distribution system separates the tiers distinctly and integration between the tiers is
often restricted by law.
This paper examines the impact three common state level regulations mandating
vertical restraints had on craft brewer entry and production: beer franchise laws which
restrict the ability for a brewer to cancel, terminate, or fail to renew a contract with a
wholesaler; mandates of exclusive territories where a brewer must designate a geographic
territory in which only one wholesaler can sell to retailers for the brands in the contract;
and restrictions on self-distribution by brewers (prohibitions on vertical integration between
manufacturers and wholesalers, known as divorcement). The wide variation of policies across
both states and time creates a quasi-experimental environment that allows the causal effects
of the policies to be identified. A number of empirical studies have examined the impact of
mandated exclusive territories in the brewing industry (Jordan and Jaffe, 1987; Culbertson
and Bradford, 1991; Sass and Saurman 1993, 1996; Rojas, 2012), franchise laws (Smith II,
1982; Brickley et. al, 1991; Klick et. al, 2012), vertical integration and divorcement (Barron
and Umbeck, 1984; Slade, 1998; Blass and Carlton, 2001), and craft breweries (Carroll and
Swaminathan, 2000; Chen, 2014; Elzinga, Tremblay and Tremblay, 2015; Gohmann, 2015),
but this is the first study to examine the impact these mandated VRs had on entry and
production of brewers.
Vertical restraints are often used by firms voluntarily for a wide number of potential
reasons. The theoretical impact is mixed. Voluntary use of VRs is often viewed to be
anti-competitive (Stiglitz and Rey, 1995; Asker and Bar-Isaac, 2014) or incentive aligning
1Section 2 of the 21st Amendment reads, “The transportation or importation into any State, Territory,
or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the
laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.” This has been interpreted as giving states the authority to regulate the
alcoholic beverages industry.
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and efficiency enhancing (Klein and Murphy, 1988; Blair and Lafontaine, 2011).2 Mandat-
ing that VRs must be used however, may actually remove either the anti-competitive or
efficiency enhancing effects their voluntary use may have. For example, VRs may be used
to prevent competitor entry, as in Asker and Bar-Isaac (2014), by using VRs to pass rents
to a downstream firm that must accommodate upstream entry. Entry may be prevented
by the threat of severing the contract or VR if entry occurs. Mandating these VRs be used
should increase entry if threats were used in such a way, as the threat to end the contract or
contractual provision is no longer legal. This paper finds the opposite occurs, giving more
credence to the benefit of voluntary VRs.
Vertical relationships are often regulated to prevent potential opportunism from
either the upstream or downstream firm where moral hazard issues may arise. In the brewing
industry, when a brewer contracts distribution rights over a product to a wholesaler, the
wholesaler may have incentives to act in a way that is not in the best interest of the brewer.
For example, it may find it profitable to distribute outside assigned territories, charge
higher prices, shirk on quality and promotional activities, etc. to the detriment of brewer
profits. Alternatively, it may be the brewer that has incentives to act opportunistically, by
threatening to terminate contracts once costly investment by the wholesaler is made. The
three mandates discussed in this paper are geared towards preventing opportunism from
brewers. I find that they reduce upstream brewery entry and production, consistent with
encouraging opportunism from the wholesalers.
This paper uses a unique dataset on the legislation of mandated VRs over 30 years
(1984-2013) across all fifty states and DC. To identify the impact of mandated exclusive
territories and beer franchise laws on the entry and production choices of craft brewers, I
implement a difference in differences model. Identification requires exogeneity of the passage
of these laws. It is plausible to believe these laws are exogenous to the growth of the craft
beer industry, since these laws were passed largely in response to nationwide increasing
market concentration in the brewing industry3 which raised concern over large firms being
2See Rey and Verge (2008) for a summary of theoretical work on vertical restraints.
3See for example, Tremblay, et. al (2005) for a discussion of increasing concentration in the brewing
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able to exert undue influence over relatively smaller wholesalers. I find that state passage
of beer franchise laws decrease net entries by 0.190 to 0.383 brewery entrants per year per
million people. This is a large effect. Mean entry over this period was 0.577 breweries per
year per million people, so this is a reduction of 33-66% compared to the mean. Further, this
effect is larger in states that have prohibited self-distribution by brewers and is estimated
to have almost no effect in states without these restrictions. Mandated exclusive territories
are also estimated in baseline results to decrease entry by 0.211 brewery entrants per year
per million people than states without, though this result is not statistically significant all
specifications, and it is estimated to be smaller when controlling for surrounding breweries.
The results on production are similar. Exclusive territory mandates are not found to have
robust effects, but franchise laws reduce craft brewery production by approximately 40%.
Finally to estimate the impact of divorcement, in a cross-sectional study I find that
states that did not restrict breweries from acting as wholesalers across the entire sample time
from 1984-2013 have had 6.80 to 8.82 more breweries per million than other states. States
that did not restrict brewery distribution had an average of 23.77 breweries per million
people in 2013, while states that did restrict brewery distribution only had on average
12.43. This accounts for approximately 60-78% of the difference in breweries between those
states. States that did not restrict breweries from acting as wholesalers also had 178-251%
more craft beer production.
This paper contributes to the literature on mandated VRs by examining the impact
on upstream entry decisions. Empirical work in this area is of particular importance since
theoretical work yields varied predictions. Two studies, Lafontaine and Slade (2008) and
Cooper et. al (2005), present overviews of empirical work that has been done on VRs
across many industries, and find that almost uniformly all studies that examine mandates
of VRs are welfare decreasing. My findings fit in line with this literature as I find mandated
VRs decrease both craft brewery entry and production, and thus lead to less variety and
consumer choice.4 These results also have important implications outside of the brewing
industry and the emergence of craft brewers.
4This result alone is not conclusive that these mandated VRs decrease welfare, as perhaps they lead to
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industry. The wine and spirits industries are regulated by states in a similar way, and have
their own “three-tier systems.” The automotive industry also has a similar set of regulations
between auto manufacturers and automobile dealers, restricting when auto manufacturers
can terminate contracts with dealers, mandating exclusive territories, and requiring sales
be through independent dealerships. Indeed, many states ban direct sales of automobiles
by manufacturers, and many have passed specific legislation to prevent Tesla Motors from
selling cars this way. The petroleum industry is also singled out in many states with
franchise laws. Lastly, this work sheds light on traditional franchise arrangements and laws,
which are common and account for a large amount of business in the US,5 and it provides
some evidence against anti-competitive uses of voluntary VRs.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 I present a theoretical
framework; in section 3 I present the data; in section 4 I describe the empirical strategy
used; section 5 discusses the results; and section 6 concludes.
2.2 Theoretical Framework
It will be worthwhile to discuss possible ways in which mandating vertical restraints
may affect a potential brewer’s entry and production decision to frame the empirical results.
A model presented by Asker and Bar-Isaac (2014) details a setting in which a number of
vertical restraints may be voluntarily employed to prevent entry.
Adapting the notation to the setting at hand (the US brewing industry), the model
is as follows. An incumbent monopolist brewer sells beer to n wholesalers and absent any
entry earns πMi as a monopolist. A potential entrant brewer considers entry into the market.
To enter it must sink the entry cost Fe, and, importantly, it must be accommodated by a
wholesaler. This is particularly fitting in the brewing industry where many states require
brewers to use an independent wholesaler. If entry occurs, the incumbent and entrant earn
lower prices and higher quantities of incumbent brands, but in light of other work in this field, I interpret
my results as suggestive of being welfare reducing.
5The 2007 Economic Census Franchise Report found that franchises made
up over 10% of employer business, and generated almost $1.3 trillion in sales.
https://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/economic census/cb10-141.html
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πCi and πCe , respectively. The timing of the game is as follows.
• The incumbent brewer sets its price and provides a lump sum transfer of rents Twi ∈
[0,∞) to each wholesaler w;
• Wholesalers compete in prices, and all profits are realized;
• The potential entrant offers lump sum transfers Twe ∈ [0,∞) to wholesalers;
• Wholesalers choose whether to accept the transfer payment and accommodate the
entrant or reject the offer;
• If accommodated the entrant pays Fe today and enters next period;
• The game is repeated infinitely.
All firms have a common discount factor δ. Asker and Bar-Isaac (2014) show that the
incumbent will set Twi = 0 if entry occurs (note the only reason for the incumbent to
provide a transfer was to prevent entry here). They further show that there exists an




1− δ − Fe
That is, if what the incumbent is willing to pay its wholesalers to prevent entry is greater
than what the entrant is willing to pay to enter, no entry occurs.
The intuition is simple: in a market with an incumbent manufacturer, the incumbent
may opt to use a vertical restraint (such as exclusive territories) as a way to transfer rents
to the downstream firms. Absent this restraint, downstream firms compete in prices and
earn lower profits whereas the upstream firm has higher profit. If a potential entrant
upstream must be accommodated by the downstream firms in order to enter, the incumbent
manufacturer may find it worthwhile to continue to grant the wholesaler a rent-transferring
vertical restraint with the threat of ending it if entry occurs. Thus, the voluntary use of
vertical restraints may be entry inhibiting. In the brewing industry’s context, this would
be applied to new brewers needing to find wholesalers who agree to carry their products
(this is especially important given many states require brewers operate with a wholesaler).
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This model suggests that if this is occurring, mandating vertical restraints should
actually increase entry and potentially increase craft beer production. This is because
the mandate removes the threat the incumbent employed of severing the restraint, which
was the mechanism which prevented entry. Note that this argument could apply equally
to exclusive territories, franchise laws and self-distribution laws. If the threat that the
incumbent brewers used was to terminate contracts or contractual provisions (by ending
the exclusive territory of the wholesaler, terminating the contract completely and hiring
the services of another wholesaler, or beginning to self-distribute) if entry upstream occurs,
mandated exclusive territories, franchise laws and prohibitions of self-distribution could
increase entry by severing the viability of these threats.6
However, mandating vertical restraints in theory may also decrease entry and pro-
duction. Mandating such provisions may encourage opportunism from wholesalers who are
now protected against termination of contracts or contractual provisions. This is best il-
lustrated by the troubles Bell’s Brewery, based in Kalamazoo, Michigan, had with state
franchise laws. In 2006, Bell’s Brewery’s Chicago wholesaler was owned by National Wine
and Spirits (NWS). NWS planned to sell the rights to distribute Bell’s brands to another
wholesaler. Bell’s opposed the sale, as they worried their brands would be ignored by the
subsequent wholesaler. Rather than engaging in a costly legal battle trying to end the
wholesale contract, Bell’s pulled distribution of their beer out of the entire state of Illinois,
despite Illinois comprising over 10% of Bell’s sales. Exiting the entire state was one of the
few provisions in which they could legally end their contract with NWS. Bell’s returned
distribution to Illinois and Chicago nearly two years later, only after NWS lost their whole-
sale license and the right to sue. This illustrates the potential for these laws to encourage
opportunistic behavior by wholesalers, thus decreasing the profitability of craft brewers,
which would lead to fewer entrants and less production.
6It is not coincidental that this is the exact sort of argument the National Beer Wholesaler’s Asso-
ciation (NBWA) use when supporting these laws. They claim that without these protections, product
variety and quality would be severely diminished. The NBWA claims these protections provide the secu-
rity to build a brand, presumably putting in the investment that otherwise would not have been made.
(www.nbwa.org/franchise-law-benefits, accessed 10-24-2014)
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Taking the Bell’s anecdote and Asker and Bar-Isaac’s model together, the theoretical
result of mandated VRs is ambiguous on brewery entry and production. The data will be
able to identify the impact of the mandates, and a finding that mandated VRs decrease
entry and production lends evidence against the model of anti-competitive voluntary use
of VRs and support anti-competitive impacts of mandated VRs, though the data does not
identify the exact mechanism by which the latter occurs. Further research will be required
to answer this question.
2.3 Data
This study utilizes multiple unique sources of data, and each will be described
below. Table 2.1 presents a brief summary description of the variables used in the analysis
and sources. Summary statistics are given in Table 2.2.
Data on yearly state level brewery counts were obtained through a request from the
Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau (TTB). The TTB is a government organization
under the Department of the Treasury. One function of the TTB is to ensure payment of
excise taxes by breweries. As such, they keep a record of permitted breweries by state and
year. The brewery count reports active records during the course of the specific year.7 One
potential drawback is this count does not distinguish between the type or size of breweries.
Each brewery is counted equally regardless of whether it is a small brew-pub producing
less than one thousand barrels of beer annually, or a large, national brand which produces
millions of barrels annually. This concern is mitigated by the fact that almost all entering
breweries are craft brewers and begin small. According to the Brewer’s Association, as
of 2013, only 54 of the 2,917 breweries in operation in the United States were not craft
breweries. I use the TTB data to construct the variable of interest Entrantsst, which is
defined as the difference in the number of breweries per million people across years. This
7It is possible that during the observation’s year the facility could have been closed, had their permit
revoked, or gone bankrupt. Additionally, this measure of brewery count may include breweries that have
registered as active but have not actually started brewing yet, so this differs from other brewery counts such
as those given by the Brewer’s Association. This count still will be a valid measure as it represents interest
in entering markets.
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definition does not distinguish between entry and exits, so is a measure of net entry.
The measure of production is from Elzinga, Tremblay and Tremblay (2015). Their
work details many of the factors that influenced craft brewery entries and production in-
creases and is complementary to this work. The source for their data came from Brewers
Digest, Brewery Directory and The New Brewer. Since the definition of a “craft” brewer
is not universally agreed upon, their definition “include[s] brewpubs, microbreweries and
craft regionals but do[es] not include contract brewers, national brewers and large regional
brewers that were in existence before 1965.”
Separately, data were also collected on the VR polices by state over time from state
statutes by the author. The variable TwoT ier is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the state
did not prevent craft breweries from distributing beer over the entire sample period (1984-
2013). In all of these cases, the law allowing self-distribution for breweries pre-dated the
emergence of craft breweries. ExTerr is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a state mandated
exclusive wholesale territories in time t, and Fran is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a
state has beer franchise termination laws in time t. Over the sample time period, 14 states
enacted mandated vertical restraints and 16 states enacted beer franchise laws. I also use
the interactions between TwoT ier and ExTerr and Fran, denoted TwoT ier × ExTerr
and TwoT ier × Fran, respectively. I cross-checked the accuracy of this legislative history
where available with other studies and several years’ editions of the Modern Brewery Age
Bluebook.8
Several states have passed small brewery exceptions to their prohibitions on brewer-
distribution. However, this is certainly endogenous to craft brewery entry. This is due to the
fact that as more breweries enter the market, if the ability to self-distribute one’s product
8A few caveats exist: Rhode Island has had franchise termination laws since 1982, but they never applied
to breweries located within RI, and so are not counted as franchise laws in estimation. Washington franchise
termination laws were passed in 1984 and originally exempted brewers who produce under 50,000 bbls. This
limit was increased to 200,000 bbls in 2009. As most brewers produce much less than either limit, WA was
not counted as having franchise laws in estimation. The beer franchise laws in Colorado passed in 2007
do not apply to breweries producing less than 300,000 gallons (approximately 9,700 bbls) and so were not
counted. Lastly, Nevada has had franchise termination laws since 1973, but similarly added an exemption for
small brewers in 1995, but with a much lower level: 2,500 bbls. Nevada thus was coded as having franchise
laws. This may raise concerns over endogeneity. Results however are robust and similar to those reported
when excluding these states entirely from the regression analysis.
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is profitable, these breweries would put pressure on the legislature to pass such exceptions.
For this reason, without an instrument, the resulting analysis using this information will be
biased. To avoid this problem and still be able to estimate the impact being able to self-
distribute has, I use the variable TwoT ier, as defined above. The growth of the craft brewing
industry began approximately in 1980.9 All two-tier states had allowed self-distribution well
before the 1980s, many beginning immediately after the repeal of prohibition. Thus, the
variable TwoT ier is likely to be exogenous from the growth of the craft brewing industry.
It will be useful to examine the growth of the craft brewing industry over time
differentiating by policy. Figure 2.2 depicts the entry rates by state from 1984 to 2013.
Panel (a) shows entry in TwoT ier states; panel (b) shows entry in the other states. From
this it can be seen that there are a large number of entries in the late 1990s, with a period
of shake-out in the early 2000s, followed by an increased period of renewed entry post 2005.
Figure 2.3 depicts the mean number of breweries per capita on the left in panels (a), (c),
and (e) and the mean number of entrants per capita in the right panels (b),(d), and (f),
separated by policies. Although the means do not appear very different according to VR
policy at the beginning of the sample, it is clear that the states for which TwoT ier = 1
experienced a much larger growth of breweries and had a much higher number of entrants
during both the late 1990s and post 2005. States without franchise laws started out similarly
but diverged in the late 1990s and have seen higher entry rates in the later part of the sample
as well. Distinguishing the impact on growth by exclusive territories is not as clear from
this approach. However, looking at panel (f), we can see states without mandated exclusive
territories saw more entrants in the late 1990s but have since seen similar entry to those
states with mandates. Similarly, Figure 2.4 depicts the average state level production of
craft beer by policy. This figure shows TwoT ier states and states without franchise laws
experienced much higher levels of production than states with more restrictive policies.
9Anchor Brewing Company is often regarded as the first craft brewing company, after it was purchased by
Fritz Maytag in 1965. Following that, New Albion, created in 1976 (closing in 1982) was the next and Sierra
Nevada’s founding in 1980 is often given credit as one of the first craft breweries. The Brewer’s Association
report that before 1980 only two craft breweries were in operation. For an excellent overview of the brewing
industry, including the craft beer industry, see Tremblay and Tremblay (2005). Also see Hindy (2014) for a
popular exposition on the emergence of the craft beer industry.
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Exclusive territory mandates do not visibly have much effect on production. Table 2.3
shows the dates of change over the sample period (1984-2013) for self-distribution laws,
exclusive territories and franchise termination laws.
Identification of the model presented in the next section depends on the variables
ExTerr and Fran being exogenous to the craft brewing industry. I argue that this is
likely true. The states that passed exclusive territorial mandates and franchise termination
restrictions first did so before 1980, and the intent was not related to small, craft brewers.
The laws were passed in response to increasing concentration in the brewing industry, and
declining number of wholesalers, as this garnered concern that brewers were putting undue
and anti-competitive pressures on their distributors.10 In 1967 the Census reports that
the four firm concentration ratio was 40%, and by 1992 this had grown to 90%; this was
still approximately the same in 2007 at 89.5%. At the same time, the Brewer’s Almanac,
published by the Beer Institute, reports that in 1967 there were 6,573 beer wholesalers
operating in the nation; this had decreased to 3,567 in 1992 and 2,095 in 2007. Much of
the brewery consolidation was a result of increasing returns and higher efficiencies at large
scales.11 Until recently there were very few trade groups that focused specifically on the
interests of craft brewers. The Brewer’s Association, a national trade group, did not form
until 2005, and many states did not have brewers guilds until recently.
Lastly, several control variables that may be related to brewery entry are included. I
include breweries per capita in neighboring states.12 This variable will account for potential
10Even state laws that do not explicitly express legislative intent have been interpreted similarly by courts.
In Arneson Distributing Co. v. Miller Brewing Co., 117 F. Supp. 2d 905 (D. Minn. 2000), it was noted
that while Minnesota’s “Beer Brewers and Wholesalers Act” does not contain a statement of purpose “that,
among its provisions, the statute prohibited brewers from fixing wholesale prices, coercing wholesalers to
accept delivery of unordered products, or discriminating among wholesalers.” Further, the ruling notes that
a previous conclusion was reached in “Rex Distributing Co., Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., Inc.” where the
ruling stated, “the chief purpose of dual distribution prohibitions like this one is to prevent brewers from
coercing beer wholesalers into violating the liquor regulatory laws by threatening to deprive them of their
distribution rights.”
11Tremblay, et. al (2005) presents evidence on the minimum efficient scale in breweries. I am not aware
of any work looking at the dynamics of concentration of beer wholesalers.







where wj is a dummy variable equaling 1 if state j is
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“brewery spillover effects” from other states, where a high number of breweries per capita
in nearby locations may induce entry. I also include economic and demographic controls of
the unemployment rate, real GDP per capita (2009 dollars), percentage of the population
that is 20 years or older, and percentage of the population that is black. This may be
necessary to control for any compositional changes within a state across time that state
fixed effects would not account for. I also include alcohol related controls collected from the
Brewer’s Almanac and published by the Beer Institute. These contain the excise tax per
barrel of beer in real dollars, and beer, wine, and spirits consumed per capita in gallons.
Spirits per capita for the year 2013 was obtained from the Distilled Spirits Council of the
United States (DISCUS). The most current year (2013) for beer consumption is missing so
this was imputed via a linear regression of the past three years.
2.4 Empirical Strategy
2.4.1 Panel Regressions
A difference in differences approach is used to investigate the impact that mandated
exclusive territories and beer franchise laws had on the entry decision of brewers. Formally
the specification used is
Entrantsst = Dstβ + Xstδ + ϕs + ϕt + εst (2.1)
ln(Prodst + 1) = Dstβ + Xstδ + ϕs + ϕt + εst (2.2)
where Entrantsst is the net number of entrants per million people in state s at time
t (calculated by taking the difference in number of TTB permits per million), Prodst is the
amount of craft beer production produced in a state, measured in 100s of barrels, Dst is a
vector of VR policy dummies and interactions; Xst are the control variables discussed in
the previous section; ϕs and ϕt are state and time fixed effects, respectively.
a direct geographic neighbor of state s and 0 otherwise. For non-continental states, California and Hawaii
were considered neighbors, as well as Washington and Alaska.
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The dependent variable Entrantsst measures the change in the number of operating
breweries per million people in a state over the period of one year. This measure is used as
it allows both brewery exits and entries, and is not dependent upon the number of existing
breweries which is likely to be highly dependent on the number of existing breweries from the
previous time period. Breweries, once founded, very rarely exit in the same year. Dividing
by population is necessary as the effect of the policy will vary by the size of the market.
This will allow for the effect of the mandates to have comparable estimated effects across
states with different populations and market sizes. The dependent variable ln(Prodst + 1)
will allow for a number of zero-level of production points to be accounted for by in effect
giving those states 100 barrels of craft beer production.
The time and state fixed effects in the difference in differences specification controls
for nationwide fluctuations in entry rates over time as well as persistent differences in entry
rates and production levels across states.
In the simplest specification, no interactions are included, so Dst consists only of
ExTerr and Fran, which will measure the impact exclusive territories and franchise laws
have had over all states. A second specification interacts exclusive territories and franchise
laws with the variable TwoT ier so Dst consists of ExTerr, Fran, TwoT ier × ExTerr,
and TwoT ier×Fran. This will allow us to distinguish between the impact that these VRs
have in states in which a manufacturer has been required to operate with a wholesaler, and
those states in which breweries can act as wholesalers and distribute their own products.
We would expect to see negative coefficients on ExTerr, Fran, and positive coefficients on
TwoT ier×ExTerr and TwoT ier×Fran if these mandated VRs act to benefit wholesalers
at the expense of manufacturers. In all specifications the parameter of interest is β, the
coefficients on the dummy variables for the policies and interactions of policies.
The interaction term between exclusive territories and franchise laws may be of
importance as Slade and Lafontaine (2008) point out. Granting of exclusive territories may
be efficiency enhancing so long as the upstream firm can verify downstream investment and
cancel the contract if it is not fulfilled. With restrictions on cancellation, any advantages to
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exclusive territories may be reduced. Although this is an economically interesting coefficient,
it is highly correlated with the un-interacted policies (the correlation coefficient between
this interaction and ExTerr is 0.91), so yields highly imprecise estimation. The results are
not reported here.
2.4.2 Cross-sectional Study
One drawback of the panel data study is that given the endogeneity of the passage
of laws for self-distribution, without an instrument one is not able to exploit the state
and time variation to determine how large of an impact self-distribution has played in
the growth of the craft beer industry. However, the two-tier states as described can be
considered exogenous to the craft beer industry, as these states allowed for brewers to act
as distributors well before the 1980s when the craft beer industry began to emerge. This
cannot be used in the panel regressions as there is no time variance in these states, but a
cross-sectional investigation can reveal the importance of self-distribution.
One illustration of the importance of self distribution, can be seen through cross
sectional regressions for each year in the sample. These regressions take the form of
Bst = αt + βttwotier × TwoT ierst + εst (2.3)
Prodcapst = αt + βttwotier × TwoT ierst + εst (2.4)
where Bst is the number of breweries per capita, Prodcapst is craft beer production
(in 10,000 bbls) per million people, and TwoT ier is a dummy variable for “two-tier” states.
Separate regressions were run for each t = 1984, ..., 2013. This simple specification reports
the difference in the conditional mean of breweries per capita across “three-tier” and “two-
tier” states. Results are depicted in figure 2.5, with a 95% confidence interval around the
point estimates. The red line is placed at zero. It can be seen that results are almost always
statistically significant and increase over time considerably.
To further investigate how large of a role the ability to act as a distributor played
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in the growth of the craft beer industry, the following regressions are presented
Bs1984 = α+ β × TwoT iers + Ds1984γ + Xs1984δ + εs (2.5)
Bs2013 −Bs1984 = α+ β × TwoT iers + (Ds2013 −Ds1984)γ + (Xs2013 −Xs1984)δ + εs
(2.6)
where Bs1984 and Bs2013 are breweries per million people in state s in years 1984
and 2013 respectively, TwoT ier is a dummy variable for whether state s is a two-tier state,
Dst is a vector of VR policy dummies and interactions, (Xs2013−Xs1984) is the difference
in control variables over the time period 1984 to 2013. The same regressions will be run
for production replacing breweries with ln(prod1984 + 1) in 2.5 and ln(prods2012−prods1984)
in 2.6. Equation 2.5 compares how the two tier states differed or not from the three tier
states at the beginning of the data (in 1984), while equation 2.6 identifies the impact that
having no restraint between manufacturers and distributors has had over the time frame
in the estimation of the coefficient β. Conversely, the negative of the coefficient β can be
interpreted as the impact imposing the VR between manufacturers and distributors has had
on the entry and production of craft brewers over the time frame.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Panel Regressions—Entry
Table 2.4 presents the results on entry for equation 2.1. Following Bertrand, Duflo
and Mullainathan (2004), all standard errors are clustered at the state level to allow for
serial correlation of the error terms within the states over time.
The coefficients of interest are those on the VR dummies. Across all specifications,
both mandated exclusive territories and franchise laws are estimated to have a negative and
sizeable impact on entry. In the simplest specification, column (1), exclusive territories and
franchise laws are found to decrease entry by by 0.211 and 0.145 breweries per million per
year, respectively, although the coefficient on franchise laws is not significant. Nevertheless,
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these are large effects. The mean entry rate over this time period was 0.577 breweries per
million people per year, so this corresponds to a 36.6% and 25.1% reduction in entry, respec-
tively. When controlling for self distribution by the interaction of the TwoT ier variable in
column (2), I find that franchise laws have a much larger effect, as the coefficient on Fran is
-0.317 and significant at the 1% level. The interaction term Fran× TwoT ier is significant
and positive, and offsets the negative coefficient on Fran. This implies that franchise laws
have a larger effect on entry in the states where self distribution is not permitted. This
makes sense since the effects of signing a contract with a distributor whose interests do not
align with the brewer’s can be very costly. The ability to self-distribute may give brewers
the time to learn about the markets, industry and available distributors to find one which
may have more common interests, whereas if a brewer is required to use a distributor from
the outset it does not have this option. The estimated impact of exclusive territories is
-0.131, though not significant. The interaction term ExTerr × TwoT ier is -0.200 and also
insignificant. It is not clear why the coefficient on ExTerr × TwoT ier is negative. This
implies that in states where a brewery can self distribute, mandated exclusive territories
have more of an impact than in states where restrictions have been placed. That said,
there are difficulties in identification caused by high degrees of multicollinearity between
the VR dummies and interactions. Specifically with regard to exclusive territories and the
interaction term, only two states for which TwoT ier = 1 in the sample mandated exclusive
territories without having franchise laws. This will be attempted to be addressed below by
considering individual policy effects.
Columns (3)-(4) of Table 2.1 repeat the above analysis but include neighboring states
breweries per capita. This variable is included to account for potential spillover effects and
is found to be significant and positive, as expected. Additionally, it impacts the results
on the VR policy dummies. When accounting for these spillovers, the VR policies are
estimated to have marginally smaller effects and lose statistical significance. Additionally
in all specifications, columns (1) - (4), no other control variables are statistically significant.
Much of this may be explained by the state and year fixed effects, as many are significant
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and may be absorbing any effect that small compositional changes within a state have.
As stated above, one difficulty is that there is multicollinearity in the policies. In-
deed, franchise laws and exclusive territories are frequently passed in the same year.13 This
leaves relatively little variation to differentiate the impact of franchise laws from exclusive
territories, especially so when also controlling for TwoT ier. To explore this, I re-estimated
equation 2.1 leaving out exclusive territories. This model will estimate the impact of fran-
chise laws imposing βET = 0, a zero effect of mandated exclusive territories, and can be
treated as an upper bound of the impact of franchise laws assuming no interactions occur
between franchise laws and mandated exclusive territories. The estimated impact of fran-
chise laws are reported in Table 2.5 and are highly significant (at the 1% level), decreasing
entry by 0.260 breweries per million in column (1). This impact is greater in TwoT ier = 0
states as column (2) shows, and less in two-tier states. As with Table 2.4, when accounting
for neighboring breweries per capita in columns (3)-(4) the coefficients on Fran are slightly
smaller but are still significant statistically and economically.
I repeat this exercise imposing zero effect of franchise laws, so βfran = 0 in Table
2.6. This can be treated as an upper bound for the effect of mandated exclusive territories,
under similar assumptions above. The estimates are similar, finding exclusive territories
reduce entry by approximately 0.308 per million, but find slightly less effect in two-tier
states. When accounting for neighboring breweries per capita, the effect is estimated to be
smaller.
From this analysis, I find that both beer franchise laws are consistently estimated
to have significant negative impacts on brewery entry. The evidence is less robust with
mandated exclusive territories. Overall, the estimates imply mandated VRs reduce entry,
indicating an anti-competitive effect of these policies. These results provide evidence for
raising costs of potential entrants and encouraging opportunism on the part of the whole-
salers. They also provide evidence against the model in Asker and Bar-Isaac (2014). In
13Out of the 13 changes in mandated exclusive territories and 15 changes in beer franchise laws over the
sample period, 7 states had both pass in the same year. These states and years are Arkansas (1991), Iowa
(1995), Louisiana (1993), Mississippi (1995), New Jersey (2006), South Dakota (1990), and Wyoming (1996).
Florida passed mandated exclusive territories and franchise laws just one year apart.
27
their model, VRs are used as a way to share rents with downstream firms. This can keep
upstream entrants who need accommodation by a downstream firm out of the market by
the threat of ending the VR. Thus mandating a VR to be used would remove that option
and increase entry. The evidence provided suggests this strategy is likely not being used
in brewing industry. Further, franchise laws seem to have the greatest impact in states in
which self-distribution is not available, which is as expected.
2.5.2 Panel Regressions—Production
Table 2.7 presents the results on entry for equation 2.2. Standard errors are again
clustered at the state level. The coefficients on exclusive territories, while large, are not
statistically significant. Franchise laws however, are estimated to size-ably reduce produc-
tion, and are statistically significant at the 5% level across all specifications. In column (1),
the coefficient on Fran is -0.679 which corresponds to an approximately 49.3% reduction in
production.14 When controlling for self-distribution laws in column (2), the estimated effect
is larger in states that restrict self-distribution. The coefficient on Fran is -0.943 which
corresponds to an approximately 61.1% reduction in production. The interaction between
Fran and TwoT ier is estimated to be 0.647, partially offsetting the effect of franchise laws
in states that did not restrict self-distribution. These are large effects, and are not estimated
to be significantly altered when controlling for neighboring breweries and production as in
columns (3) and (4).
Additionally, while this is not the primary goal of the paper, there are interesting
findings on the effect of beer excise taxes. The tax rate is estimated to have a significant
effect on production and appears to be elastic as the elasticity ranges from -1.21 to -1.31.
There is also significantly less production in states with more beer consumption per capita.
This may seem counter-intuitive, but could reflect the differing nature of craft beer compared
to large brewery’s products. Craft beer tends to be more expensive and higher in alcohol
so this could reflect that as preferences for craft beer increases total volume consumed may
14Since the measure of production is in logs, the marginal effect is calculated by exp(−0.679)− 1 = 0.493.
28
decrease.
As above, the high degree of multicollinearity may be problematic. Addressing this,
Table 2.8 presents the results considering only franchise laws and Table 2.9 presents results
considering only exclusive territories. When considering only franchise laws, the effects are
reduced but still large and statistically significant. The coefficients on Fran range from
-0.513 to -0.527, an effect of 40.1-41.0%. The interaction term between Fran and TwoT ier
is small (0.026-0.033) but positive. In Table 2.9 no coefficients on exclusive territories are
statistically significant. These findings correspond to Figure 2.4 where states with franchise
laws can be seen to have much lower production levels. Not much difference is apparent
when considering mandated exclusive territories.
This analysis on production mostly accords with what was found on the effect of
entry; franchise laws are found to not only decrease entry, but significantly decreases craft
beer production. This effect is mitigated somewhat if self-distribution by brewers is not
illegal. Further, it indicates that franchise laws have a larger effect on craft breweries than
exclusive territories, especially regarding production, which fits in line with the hypothesis
that these laws increase opportunistic behavior of wholesalers.
2.5.3 Further Considerations and Robustness Checks
To further establish the effect and robustness of the estimation strategy above, the
estimation is repeated with the addition of “placebo” treatment variables of leads of the
VR dummies. The 5 year leads, defined as Dst+5, are dummy variables equal to 1 if state s
at time t had a VR policy in year t+ 5. This will support that the difference in differences
specification is picking up the effect of the law, and not something else that is occurring
in those states with law changes. If the lead “placebo” is significant, it would cast doubt
on that assumption. Additionally, regressions will be run with lags of the VR dummies,
defined similarly. The lagged treatment dummies will be used similarly. However, since it
would be expected that these laws would have persistent effects, we would not necessarily
expect insignificant results on the lags if the timing of the law passages coincided with
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exogenous national entry/exit patterns. The magnitude and size of the lags will thus give
an idea of the impact of the laws over time. As figure 2.3 shows in panels (b), (d), and (f),
there were two “waves” of entry over this time period. The first occurred in the early 1990s,
ending with negative entry rates in the early 2000s, and the second occurred approximately
starting in 2005. There is no shakeout apparent in production seen in figure 2.4.
The results on entry with the lead placebos are presented in Table 2.10 and the
results on production are presented in Table 2.14. As can be seen, none of the “placebo”
lead dummies are significant. The estimated impacts on entry remain largely unchanged and
retain similar signifance to earlier estimates, yielding credibility to the empirical approach.
The estimated impacts on production are now lower and lose statistical significance, but
it should be noted that these impacts are still quite sizable economically. Table 2.11 and
Table 2.15 present similar results, only including dummies for franchise laws in panel (a)
and only including dummies for exclusive territories in panel (b). Results are again similar
to above.
The results from estimation including lagged VR mandate dummies are presented
in Table 2.12 for entry. Mandated exclusive territories are estimated to decrease brewery
entry ranging from -0.335 to -0.514 breweries per million people, all significant at the 5%
level. The effect is larger in TwoT ier = 0 states. This effect is offset by the 5 year lag terms,
so the effect is estimated to be only temporary. The estimated coefficients of franchise laws
are small and insignificant on the un-lagged variable, but the lagged franchise dummies are
negative and larger than the un-lagged dummies in all specifications except column (3).
The lagged interaction term TwoT ier × Fran is positive and significant at the 1% and
5% levels in columns (2) and (4), respectively. This accords with the previous results, but
taken at face value, suggests that the franchise laws possibly had a larger impact in a longer
run. Recall that Figure 2.3 shows two “waves” of entry: first starting in the early 1990s and
ending with a plateau and period of shakeout, with the second “wave” starting around 2005.
It may be difficult with several interactions and lagged policies to disentangle precise effects
of the laws with this pattern of entry. For example, perhaps franchise laws simply had a
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small effect during periods of near zero net entry in the early 2000s and impacted entry
more during the second “wave” of entry as seen in figure 2.3. Additionally, multicollinearity
is still a concern.
Eight of the thirteen law changes in exclusive territories were passed during the first
“wave” of entry seen in Figure 2.3 between 1990 and 2000, and three were passed before
1990. Out of the nine franchise laws passed between 1990 and 2000, only two were in
states that did not mandate exclusive territories. Multicollinearity is again a concern as
from 1990-2000, six states passed both franchise laws and mandated exclusive territories
the same year.
To address this concern, Table 2.13 repeats this analysis examining franchise laws
and exclusive territories separately. The results in panel (a) have results that not only are
easier to interpret but also are very similar to previous results without lagged VR dummies.
Franchise laws are estimated to significantly (at the 5% level) reduce entry by 0.256-0.333
breweries per million per year, with the larger effects being in states with self-distribution
restrictions. All lagged coefficients are insignificant and most are small. The results look
very similar to Table 2.5, and lend credibility to the previous estimates. In panel (b)
exclusive territories are examined. The results are also similar to Table 2.6, but find large
values on the lags of ExTerr.
The results on production with lagged treatment variables in Table 2.16 are neater
and easier to interpret. Note that Figure 2.4 does not show any shakeout periods in pro-
duction as with entry. Table 2.16 finds very similar results to the estimates without lags,
namely, a large decrease in production from franchise laws and larger still in TwoT ier = 0
states. Exclusive territory mandates do not have significant effects. Table 2.17 also finds
similar results as before when considering franchise laws and exclusive territories separately.
The findings in the panel regressions suggest that these laws encouraged opportunis-
tic behavior of downstream wholesalers and decreased entry and total production of craft
brewers, with the largest effects coming from beer franchise laws. These results also suggest
that to any extent large brewers use VRs voluntarily in an anticompetitive way (as in Asker
31
and Bar-Isaac, 2014), the effect is small compared to the effect of increasing moral hazard
problems as discussed.
2.5.4 Cross-Sectional Regressions—Entry
To assess the impact of self-distribution on brewery entry, cross sectional results are
examined. Table 2.18 presents results from equation 2.5. While some point estimates on
TwoT ier are positive and significant at the 10% level, they are relatively small. By 1984 very
few craft breweries were operating, so these results may be driven by the existing non-craft
breweries that were later consolidated into the larger, national breweries.15 Additionally,
the spillover effects from neighboring breweries per capita is not present and is estimated to
be negative in column (4) at the 10% level. There is no significant difference in the number
of breweries per million on any other VR policy or interaction term. I take this, along with
figure 2.3, as evidence that at the beginning of the sample period (1984) the states looked
roughly similar, even across VR policies, in terms of the number of craft breweries present
in each state.
Table 2.19 presents the results from equation 2.6. The coefficient on TwoT ier is
large and statistically significant in most specifications. The estimates range from 6.80 to
8.82. This is a large effect. For comparison TwoT ier = 0 states have an average of 12.42
breweries per million in 2013, and TwoT ier = 1 states have an average of 23.76 breweries
per million people (this is significantly different with t=2.78, p=0.0078). Thus the impact
of TwoT ier accounts for 60%-78% of the observed difference between the averages and a
significant percentage of the increase in the number of breweries per capita within two-tier
states.
15While the data I have do not distinguish between the size or types of breweries, the Brewer’s Association,
using a different count than the TTB, report that in 1984 there were only 18 craft breweries operating
nationally. The rest were large national, regional or other non-craft breweries.
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2.5.5 Cross-Sectional Regressions—Production
Similar results are found with production data. Table 2.20 presents results from
equation 2.5 with ln(prods1984 + 1) as the dependent variable. No coefficient on TwoT ier
is found to be significant, indicating these states looked similar in the amount of craft beer
production in 1984. Results from equation 2.6 are presented in Table 2.21 with ln(prods2012−
prod1984) as the dependent variable. Estimates of the coefficient on TwoT ier range from
1.02 to 1.26, which correspond to a 178% to 251% increase in production.16 This large
effect can be readily seen in panel (a) of Figure 2.4. In 2012, TwoT ier = 1 states produced
on average approximately 673,000 bbls of craft beer whereas TwoT ier = 0 states produced
only 103,000 bbls of craft beer.
A reasonable question is whether these results indicate that these mandates are wel-
fare decreasing or not. While they indicate they decrease the surplus of potential entrants,
they do not directly indicate how incumbent producer surplus or consumer surplus is af-
fected. If consumer choice is a valued product, these laws decrease that, but if it comes at
the additional benefit of lower prices or higher quality goods, consumers may still benefit.
However, I interpret the results as suggestive of being welfare decreasing.
2.6 Conclusion
This paper examines the impact various vertical restraints mandated by state regula-
tions had on the entry and production decision of firms in the brewing industry. Theoretical
work is ambiguous on the competitive nature of such restraints and their impact on the prof-
itability of manufacturers so empirical work is of particular importance. I find that passage
of beer franchise termination laws causes a decrease in the number of breweries and total
level of craft beer production relative to those without these laws. This effect is not as
strong in states which have not prohibited brewers from acting as wholesalers. This result
makes sense since the option of self-distribution means that these brewers have the option
16The marginal effects are calculated exp(1.255)− 1 = 2.51 and exp(1.023)− 1 = 1.78
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of bypassing wholesalers when beginning operations. This option will potentially give the
brewer more time to find a wholesaler which will align with more closely with its interests.
I also find that prohibiting integration between beer manufacturers and wholesalers
had a negative and large impact on brewery entry and production compared to states
without prohibitions. Most breweries start out as very small enterprises. If it is costly
to find or negotiate small volume sales with a wholesaler being able to distribute one’s
product is important. This is of greater importance in states with beer franchise termination
restrictions since it can be extremely difficult to get out of a contract once signed in those
states. This study also finds some evidence that mandating exclusive territories decreases
brewer entry, though this is not a robust result.
Lastly, this paper provides evidence against use of voluntary VRs as a means to
dampen competition. The reasoning is that if upstream firms passed rents downstream
(via exclusive territories, e.g.) and threatened to sever the contract if entry upstream was
accommodated by the downstream firms, mandating the use of VRs or restricting the ability
to sever contracts would remove the viability of that threat and increase entry. I find the
opposite: that entry and production decreases with mandated VRs.
While this paper covered the brewing industry, and specifically craft breweries, these
VR regulations are not unique to brewing. The wine and spirits industries are governed
by similar laws, and this study sheds light on traditional franchise laws. Additionally,
the petroleum and automotive industry, like the brewing industry is dominated by a small
number of large firms, and many states regulate vertical relations through specific petroleum
and automotive franchise laws.17 The impact of these laws is very similar to beer franchise
laws in that “good cause” is necessary to cancel or fail to renew a contract between a
manufacturer and wholesaler, and exclusive territories are often required. Self-distribution
is prohibited in many cases, as the electric car company Tesla Motors shows— many states
have banned the method of direct sales Tesla employs to bypass dealerships. Lastly, the
franchise business model is very common, and this study examines laws similar to laws
17Lafontaine and Morton (2010) give a description and history of franchise regulations in the automotive
industry in the context of the most recent financial crisis.
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many states have for traditional franchises.
This paper does not directly address the impact on total welfare that the mandated
VRs examined here have. However, I interpret the results as being suggestive that these
laws decrease welfare. Previous papers (Sass and Saurman, 1993; and Rojas, 2012) which
suggested positive welfare changes from mandated exclusive territories argued that these
mandates were valuable to brewers that would have not used exclusive territories without
a mandate for fear of litigation. This research suggests it may be better to neither legally
prevent nor mandate vertical restrictions.
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Table 2.1: Variable Descriptions
Var. Name Description Source
Breweries Number of active brewery records as reported
by the TTB
TTB
Breweries/cap Number of active brewery records as reported
by the TTB per million people
Entrants Difference in number of active brewery records
as reported by the TTB per million people
Production Total barrels of craft beer production Elzinga, Trem-
blay and Trembly
(2015)
TwoT ier Equals 1 if state s in has allowed breweries to




ExTerr Equals 1 if state s in time t mandates exclusive




Fran Equals 1 if state s in time t has passed fran-
chise termination restriction laws between brew-
ers and wholesalers, 0 otherwise
Collected by
author
TwoT ier × ExTerr Interaction between TwoT ier and ExTerr
TwoT ier × Fran Interaction between TwoT ier and Fran
Neighboring Breweries/cap Number of active brewery records in surround-
ing states as reported by the TTB per million
people
Neighboring Production Production of other states weighted by inverse




Real GDP/cap Real GDP per capita in 2009 $s BEA
Unemployment Unemployment rate in state s at time t BLS
%Black Pop Percentage of population black Census
%20 year+ Pop Percentage of population 20 years and older Census
Real Tax/bbl Real excise tax rate on beer in 2009 dollars per
barrel
Beer Institute
Beer/cap Gallons of beer consumed per capita Beer Institute
Wine/cap Gallons of wine consumed per capita Beer Institute
Spirits/cap Gallons of spirits consumed per capita Beer Institute
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Breweries 27.49 46.452 0 528 1530
Breweries/capa 6.711 8.888 0 71.813 1530
Entrantsa 0.577 1.639 -6.694 14.615 1479
Productionb 9.416 28.884 0 364.717 1479
TwoT ier 0.392 0.488 0 1 1530
ExTerr 0.577 0.494 0 1 1530
Fran 0.742 0.438 0 1 1530
TwoT ier × ExTerr 0.167 0.373 0 1 1530
TwoT ier × Fran 0.256 0.437 0 1 1530
Neighboring Breweries/cap 5.690 5.672 0 45.72 1530
Neighboring Production 37.708 50.209 0 511.6989 1479
Unemployment 5.834 1.961 2.242 14.7 1530
Real GDP/cap 42.972 16.598 23.018 174.401 1530
%Black Pop 10.734 11.453 0.227 65.141 1530
%20 year+ Pop 70.118 4.584 52.78 79.535 1530
Real Tax/bbl 19.496 9.025 6.986 66.291 1530
Beer/cap (gallons) 23.050 3.908 12.2410 39.628 1530
Wine/cap (gallons) 2.051 1.100 0.489 7.027 1530
Spirits/cap (gallons) 1.560 0.619 0.686 5.939 1530
a breweries per million people
b production is expressed in 10,000 bbl units
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Table 2.3: Year changes of VRs




















Maine 1986 1971 1979
Maryland 2013 1974 1974
Massachusetts Two-tier 1972
Michigan 2014 1977 1984
Minnesota Two-tier 1977 1977
Mississippi 1995 1995
Missouri 1985 1977
Montana Two-tier 1974 1974
Nebraska 1976 1976
Nevada 1973
New Hampshire 1999 1981 1981
New Jersey Two-tier 2006 2006
New Mexico Two-tier 1981
New York Two-tier 1996
North Carolina 1993 1982 1982
North Dakota 2013 1981 1981
Ohio Two-tier 1974 1974
Oklahoma Two-tier
Oregon Two-tier 1981 1989
Pennsylvania Two-tier 1980 1980
Rhode Island Two-tier
South Carolina 1983 1974
South Dakota 1990 1990
Tennessee 1991 1973 1990
Texas 1993 1995 1981
Utah 1994 1998
Vermont Two-tier 1976 1976
Virginia 1985 1978
Washington Two-tier
West Virginia 1993 1971 1971
Wisconsin Two-tier 2006 2004
Wyoming 1999 1996 1996
=law change during panel observations
Notes: Self-distribution dates refer to legislation passed allowing
small breweries to self-distribute. Two-tier refers to states that
have not had prohibitions on brewery self-distribution; these states
allowed breweries distribute their own beer or to hold wholesale
licenses. CO, RI, and WA have franchise laws for some breweries,
but they would not apply to most craft breweries in those states.
UT exclusive territories do not apply to craft breweries. See text
for more details.
Source: Collected by author.
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Table 2.4: Impact of VR on brewery entry, panel regression 1985-2013
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ExTerr -0.211* -0.131 -0.124 -0.041
(0.12) (0.15) (0.13) (0.17)
Fran -0.145 -0.317*** -0.124 -0.266
(0.09) (0.12) (0.11) (0.16)
TwoT ier × ExTerr -0.200 -0.206
(0.17) (0.20)
TwoT ier × Fran 0.438*** 0.360*
(0.13) (0.18)
Neighboring Breweries/cap 0.067** 0.066**
(0.03) (0.03)
%20 year+ Pop 0.013 0.020 -0.042 -0.036
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
Real Tax/bbl -0.004 -0.004 -0.023 -0.023
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Real GDP/cap 0.002 0.002 0.006 0.005
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Unemployment 0.027 0.026 0.023 0.023
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
%Black Pop -0.038 -0.039 -0.022 -0.024
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Beer/cap 0.053 0.056 0.054 0.056
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Wine/cap -0.165 -0.160 -0.144 -0.140
(0.22) (0.22) (0.23) (0.23)
Spirit/cap -0.050 -0.052 -0.134 -0.133
(0.28) (0.28) (0.29) (0.28)
State & Year FE Y Y Y Y
R2 0.372 0.372 0.378 0.378
N 1479 1479 1479 1479
Note: Table 2.4 presents the results of a linear model with the number of entering
breweries per million people as the dependent variable in columns (1)-(4). Robust
standard errors, clustered at the state level are in parenthesis where *, **, *** denote
significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 2.5: Impact of VR imposing βET = 0, entry panel regression 1985-2013
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fran -0.260*** -0.383*** -0.190** -0.282**
(0.08) (0.10) (0.09) (0.12)
TwoT ier × Fran 0.315** 0.235
(0.13) (0.16)
Neighboring Breweries/cap 0.067** 0.067**
(0.03) (0.03)
%20 year+ Pop 0.015 0.022 -0.041 -0.035
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
Real Tax/bbl -0.003 -0.004 -0.023 -0.023
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Real GDP/cap 0.002 0.002 0.006 0.006
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Unemployment 0.031 0.028 0.025 0.023
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
%Black Pop -0.037 -0.037 -0.021 -0.021
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Beer/cap 0.053 0.055 0.054 0.056
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Wine/cap -0.156 -0.155 -0.139 -0.138
(0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22)
Spirit/cap -0.062 -0.071 -0.143 -0.148
(0.27) (0.27) (0.28) (0.27)
State & Year FE Y Y Y Y
R2 0.372 0.372 0.378 0.378
N 1479 1479 1479 1479
Note: Table 2.5 presents the results of a linear model with the number of entering
breweries per million people as the dependent variable in columns (1)-(4). Robust
standard errors, clustered at the state level are in parenthesis where *, **, *** denote
significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 2.6: Impact of VR imposing βfran = 0, entry panel regression 1985-2013
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ExTerr -0.308*** -0.363*** -0.206* -0.234*
(0.10) (0.13) (0.11) (0.14)
TwoT ier × ExTerr 0.131 0.065
(0.14) (0.16)
Neighboring Breweries/cap 0.067** 0.067**
(0.03) (0.03)
%20 year+ Pop 0.010 0.012 -0.044 -0.043
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
Real Tax/bbl -0.004 -0.004 -0.023 -0.024
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Real GDP/cap 0.002 0.002 0.006 0.006
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Unemployment 0.026 0.024 0.022 0.021
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
%Black Pop -0.040 -0.039 -0.024 -0.023
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Beer/cap 0.051 0.051 0.053 0.053
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Wine/cap -0.167 -0.169 -0.146 -0.147
(0.22) (0.22) (0.23) (0.23)
Spirit/cap -0.056 -0.062 -0.139 -0.142
(0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29)
State & Year FE Y Y Y Y
R2 0.371 0.372 0.378 0.378
N 1479 1479 1479 1479
Note: Table 2.6 presents the results of a linear model with the number of entering
breweries per million people as the dependent variable in columns (1)-(4). Robust
standard errors, clustered at the state level are in parenthesis where *, **, *** denote
significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 2.7: Impact of VR on craft production, panel regression 1984-2012
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ExTerr 0.318 0.710 0.341 0.759
(0.36) (0.46) (0.36) (0.47)
Fran -0.679** -0.943** -0.690** -0.954**
(0.31) (0.42) (0.31) (0.42)
TwoT ier × ExTerr -1.001 -1.049
(0.65) (0.65)
TwoT ier × Fran 0.647 0.647
(0.55) (0.55)
ln Neighboring Breweries/cap 0.115 0.164
(0.29) (0.30)
ln Neighboring Prod 0.100 0.110
(0.23) (0.22)
ln %20 year+ Pop -2.764 -2.552 -1.712 -1.477
(5.48) (5.53) (5.67) (5.75)
ln Pop 1.900 2.057 2.111 2.283
(1.25) (1.27) (1.51) (1.54)
ln Real Tax/bbl -1.307** -1.252** -1.265* -1.212*
(0.62) (0.61) (0.64) (0.64)
ln Real GDP/cap -1.238* -1.248* -1.349 -1.361
(0.70) (0.69) (0.82) (0.82)
ln Unemployment -0.272 -0.248 -0.277 -0.251
(0.28) (0.27) (0.28) (0.27)
ln %Black Pop -0.200 -0.207 -0.258 -0.278
(0.37) (0.36) (0.37) (0.37)
ln Beer/cap -3.373** -3.338** -3.412** -3.376**
(1.38) (1.38) (1.34) (1.34)
ln Wine/cap 0.643 0.755 0.664 0.781
(0.66) (0.66) (0.66) (0.65)
ln Spirit/cap 0.639 0.757 0.641 0.746
(1.01) (1.01) (1.06) (1.06)
State & Year FE Y Y Y Y
R2 0.872 0.873 0.872 0.873
N 1479 1479 1479 1479
Note: Table 2.7 presents the results of a linear model with the log of craft beer pro-
duction (in hundreds of barrels) plus one as the dependent variable in columns (1)-(4).
Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level are in parenthesis where *, **, ***
denote significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 2.8: Impact of VR imposing βET = 0, production panel regression 1984-2012
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fran -0.513** -0.526** -0.517** -0.527**
(0.23) (0.25) (0.24) (0.26)
TwoT ier × Fran 0.033 0.026
(0.42) (0.42)
ln Neighboring Breweries/cap 0.068 0.065
(0.29) (0.29)
ln Neighboring Prod 0.095 0.096
(0.23) (0.23)
ln %20 year+ Pop -3.003 -2.959 -1.954 -1.910
(5.47) (5.54) (5.69) (5.77)
ln Pop 1.957 1.969 2.166 2.176
(1.24) (1.27) (1.50) (1.53)
ln Real Tax/bbl -1.345** -1.344** -1.298** -1.296**
(0.61) (0.61) (0.63) (0.64)
ln Real GDP/cap -1.255* -1.258* -1.370* -1.373
(0.69) (0.69) (0.82) (0.82)
ln Unemployment -0.282 -0.284 -0.286 -0.287
(0.28) (0.27) (0.28) (0.27)
ln %Black Pop -0.227 -0.230 -0.273 -0.274
(0.37) (0.36) (0.38) (0.37)
ln Beer/cap -3.356** -3.341** -3.411** -3.401**
(1.38) (1.40) (1.36) (1.37)
ln Wine/cap 0.573 0.580 0.583 0.588
(0.69) (0.68) (0.69) (0.68)
ln Spirit/cap 0.766 0.762 0.798 0.797
(1.01) (1.00) (1.06) (1.05)
State & Year FE Y Y Y Y
R2 0.872 0.872 0.872 0.872
N 1479 1479 1479 1479
Note: Table 2.8 presents the results of a linear model with the log of craft beer pro-
duction (in hundreds of barrels) plus one as the dependent variable in columns (1)-(4).
Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level are in parenthesis where *, **, ***
denote significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 2.9: Impact of VR imposing βfran = 0, production panel regression 1984-2012
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ExTerr -0.122 0.076 -0.102 0.130
(0.32) (0.38) (0.33) (0.39)
TwoT ier × ExTerr -0.532 -0.590
(0.58) (0.57)
ln Neighboring Breweries/cap 0.138 0.206
(0.29) (0.30)
ln Neighboring Prod 0.060 0.058
(0.23) (0.22)
ln %20 year+ Pop -3.700 -4.051 -3.171 -3.671
(5.49) (5.46) (5.63) (5.55)
ln Pop 2.022 1.985 2.143 2.091
(1.24) (1.24) (1.53) (1.52)
ln Real Tax/bbl -1.288** -1.277** -1.276** -1.278**
(0.61) (0.61) (0.63) (0.63)
ln Real GDP/cap -1.296* -1.273* -1.349 -1.308
(0.68) (0.69) (0.82) (0.82)
ln Unemployment -0.294 -0.266 -0.298 -0.268
(0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28)
ln %Black Pop -0.172 -0.151 -0.224 -0.218
(0.38) (0.38) (0.39) (0.39)
ln Beer/cap -3.522** -3.664** -3.515** -3.638**
(1.42) (1.45) (1.38) (1.41)
ln Wine/cap 0.483 0.463 0.504 0.492
(0.70) (0.69) (0.69) (0.68)
ln Spirit/cap 0.653 0.756 0.615 0.689
(1.05) (1.05) (1.11) (1.11)
State & Year FE Y Y Y Y
R2 0.870 0.871 0.870 0.871
N 1479 1479 1479 1479
Note: Table 2.9 presents the results of a linear model with the log of craft beer pro-
duction (in hundreds of barrels) plus one as the dependent variable in columns (1)-(4).
Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level are in parenthesis where *, **, ***
denote significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 2.10: “Placebo” Lead Dummy Variables, impact on entry
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ExTerr -0.338 -0.155 -0.254 -0.082
(0.21) (0.20) (0.20) (0.21)
Fran -0.183 -0.359*** -0.155 -0.282**
(0.15) (0.10) (0.15) (0.12)
TwoT ier × ExTerr -0.390 -0.385
(0.36) (0.35)
TwoT ier × Fran 0.400 0.271
(0.27) (0.28)
ExTerr (5 year lead) 0.299 0.113 0.306 0.147
(0.38) (0.40) (0.40) (0.42)
Fran (5 year lead) 0.092 0.134 0.077 0.071
(0.31) (0.23) (0.36) (0.37)
TwoT ier × ExTerr (5 year lead) 0.283 0.246
(0.84) (0.86)
TwoT ier × Fran (5 year lead) -0.062 0.056
(0.70) (0.77)
Neighboring Breweries/cap 0.066** 0.066**
(0.03) (0.03)
%20 year+ Pop 0.012 0.018 -0.043 -0.036
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
Real Tax/bbl -0.005 -0.004 -0.024 -0.024
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Real GDP/cap 0.003 0.002 0.006 0.005
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Unemployment 0.032 0.031 0.028 0.028
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
%Black Pop -0.040 -0.040 -0.024 -0.025
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Beer/cap 0.056 0.059* 0.057 0.060*
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Wine/cap -0.170 -0.162 -0.150 -0.143
(0.22) (0.22) (0.23) (0.23)
Spirit/cap -0.070 -0.071 -0.153 -0.152
(0.28) (0.27) (0.28) (0.28)
State & Year FE Y Y Y Y
R2 0.373 0.373 0.379 0.379
N 1479 1479 1479 1479
Note: Table 2.10 presents the results of a linear model with the number of entering
breweries per million people as the dependent variable in columns (1)-(4). Robust
standard errors, clustered at the state level are in parenthesis where *, **, *** denote
significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 2.11: “Placebo” Lead Dummy Variables, Franchise and Ex. Terr Separate Regressions
Panel (a) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Fran -0.368** -0.447*** -0.293** -0.327**
(0.14) (0.15) (0.14) (0.15)
TwoT ier × Fran 0.228 0.095
(0.27) (0.27)
Fran (5 year lead) 0.266 0.198 0.254 0.142
(0.21) (0.31) (0.22) (0.33)
TwoT ier × Fran (5 year lead) 0.089 0.208
(0.40) (0.41)
Neighboring Breweries/cap 0.067** 0.067**
(0.03) (0.03)
Panel (b) (1) (2) (3) (4)
ExTerr -0.466** -0.434** -0.362* -0.298
(0.18) (0.21) (0.18) (0.22)
TwoT ier × ExTerr -0.080 -0.172
(0.30) (0.30)
ExTerr (5 year lead) 0.368 0.253 0.364 0.233
(0.25) (0.43) (0.24) (0.35)
TwoT ier × ExTerr (5 year lead) 0.212 0.264
(0.53) (0.47)
Neighboring Breweries/cap 0.066** 0.067**
(0.03) (0.03)
State & Year FE Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y
Note: Table 2.11 presents the results of a linear model with the number of entering
breweries per million people as the dependent variable in columns (1)-(4). Robust
standard errors, clustered at the state level are in parenthesis where *, **, *** denote
significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 2.12: Lagged VR Treatment Variables, impact on entry
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ExTerr -0.386** -0.514** -0.335** -0.444**
(0.15) (0.20) (0.14) (0.19)
Fran -0.053 -0.043 -0.068 -0.082
(0.08) (0.13) (0.10) (0.17)
TwoT ier × ExTerr 0.234 0.218
(0.24) (0.23)
TwoT ier × Fran 0.005 0.063
(0.19) (0.22)
ExTerr (5 year lag) 0.260 0.539*** 0.322 0.567***
(0.20) (0.17) (0.20) (0.18)
Fran (5 year lag) -0.126 -0.393*** -0.057 -0.250
(0.16) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15)
TwoT ier × ExTerr (5 year lag) -0.619* -0.588
(0.37) (0.36)
TwoT ier × Fran (5 year lag) 0.648*** 0.446*
(0.24) (0.24)
Neighboring Breweries/cap 0.069** 0.067**
(0.03) (0.03)
%20 year+ Pop 0.011 0.017 -0.048 -0.043
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
Real Tax/bbl -0.003 -0.003 -0.022 -0.021
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Real GDP/cap 0.002 0.001 0.005 0.004
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Unemployment 0.028 0.028 0.024 0.025
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
%Black Pop -0.038 -0.041 -0.023 -0.026
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Beer/cap 0.054 0.059 0.055 0.059
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Wine/cap -0.152 -0.153 -0.121 -0.122
(0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23)
Spirit/cap -0.052 -0.052 -0.141 -0.136
(0.28) (0.27) (0.28) (0.28)
State & Year FE Y Y Y Y
R2 0.373 0.374 0.380 0.381
N 1479 1479 1479 1479
Note: Table 2.12 presents the results of a linear model with the number of entering
breweries per million people as the dependent variable in columns (1)-(4). Robust
standard errors, clustered at the state level are in parenthesis where *, **, *** denote
significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 2.13: Lagged VR Treatment Variables, Franchise and Ex. Terr Separate Regressions
Panel (a) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Fran -0.269** -0.331** -0.256** -0.333**
(0.10) (0.14) (0.10) (0.14)
TwoT ier × Fran 0.126 0.179
(0.21) (0.20)
Fran (5 year lag) 0.015 -0.071 0.115 0.088
(0.17) (0.18) (0.17) (0.19)
TwoT ier × Fran (5 year lag) 0.296 0.099
(0.36) (0.34)
Neighboring Breweries/cap 0.069** 0.067**
(0.03) (0.03)
Panel (b) (1) (2) (3) (4)
ExTerr -0.422*** -0.535*** -0.382*** -0.497***
(0.13) (0.16) (0.11) (0.13)
TwoT ier × ExTerr 0.272 0.293
(0.22) (0.18)
ExTerr (5 year lag) 0.184 0.249 0.292 0.389**
(0.20) (0.18) (0.20) (0.19)
TwoT ier × ExTerr (5 year lag) -0.178 -0.295
(0.49) (0.45)
Neighboring Breweries/cap 0.070** 0.070**
(0.03) (0.03)
State & Year FE Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y
Note: Table 2.13 presents the results of a linear model with the number of entering
breweries per million people as the dependent variable in columns (1)-(4). Robust
standard errors, clustered at the state level are in parenthesis where *, **, *** denote
significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 2.14: “Placebo” Lead Dummy Variables, impact on production
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ExTerr 0.245 0.632 0.280 0.676
(0.43) (0.56) (0.43) (0.57)
Fran -0.445 -0.712 -0.441 -0.692
(0.38) (0.54) (0.38) (0.54)
TwoT ier × ExTerr -1.013 -1.031
(0.82) (0.81)
TwoT ier × Fran 0.607 0.569
(0.66) (0.66)
ExTerr (5 year lead) 0.172 0.115 0.163 0.141
(0.49) (0.73) (0.49) (0.71)
Fran (5 year lead) -0.559 -0.555 -0.608 -0.656
(0.54) (0.80) (0.53) (0.79)
TwoT ier × ExTerr (5 year lead) 0.159 0.078
(0.90) (0.88)
TwoT ier × Fran (5 year lead) 0.068 0.189
(0.89) (0.90)
ln Neighboring Breweries/cap 0.144 0.190
(0.30) (0.31)
ln Neighboring Prod 0.150 0.159
(0.22) (0.22)
ln %20 year+ Pop -2.360 -1.944 -0.694 -0.132
(5.45) (5.67) (5.57) (5.98)
ln Pop 1.821 2.008 2.132 2.346
(1.27) (1.29) (1.51) (1.56)
ln Real Tax/bbl -1.287** -1.240** -1.218* -1.180*
(0.61) (0.60) (0.64) (0.63)
ln Real GDP/cap -1.273* -1.291* -1.452* -1.468*
(0.70) (0.69) (0.83) (0.83)
ln Unemployment -0.283 -0.261 -0.291 -0.268
(0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28)
ln %Black Pop -0.200 -0.217 -0.279 -0.313
(0.36) (0.35) (0.37) (0.37)
ln Beer/cap -3.509** -3.409** -3.598** -3.490**
(1.41) (1.40) (1.37) (1.36)
ln Wine/cap 0.633 0.758 0.657 0.794
(0.65) (0.65) (0.64) (0.64)
ln Spirit/cap 0.679 0.768 0.706 0.791
(1.01) (1.01) (1.05) (1.06)
State & Year FE Y Y Y Y
R2 0.873 0.874 0.873 0.874
N 1479 1479 1479 1479
Note: Table 2.14 presents the results of a linear model with the log of craft beer
production (in hundreds of barrels) plus one as the dependent variable in columns (1)-
(4). Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level are in parenthesis where *, **,
*** denote significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 2.15: “Placebo” Lead Dummy Variables, Franchise and Ex. Terr Separate Regressions
Panel (a) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Fran -0.319 -0.331 -0.304 -0.307
(0.26) (0.29) (0.27) (0.30)
TwoT ier × Fran 0.026 -0.000
(0.54) (0.55)
Fran (5 year lead) -0.459 -0.541 -0.508 -0.614
(0.38) (0.60) (0.38) (0.61)
TwoT ier × Fran (5 year lead) 0.177 0.229
(0.71) (0.73)
ln Neighboring Breweries/cap 0.097 0.096
(0.30) (0.31)
ln Neighboring Prod 0.145 0.152
(0.22) (0.22)
Panel (b) (1) (2) (3) (4)
ExTerr -0.012 0.156 0.023 0.218
(0.33) (0.35) (0.34) (0.37)
TwoT ier × ExTerr -0.540 -0.594
(0.69) (0.68)
ExTerr (5 year lead) -0.254 -0.237 -0.283 -0.262
(0.32) (0.50) (0.32) (0.50)
TwoT ier × ExTerr (5 year lead) 0.120 0.124
(0.64) (0.64)
ln Neighboring Breweries/cap 0.151 0.209
(0.29) (0.30)
ln Neighboring Prod 0.077 0.071
(0.23) (0.22)
State & Year FE Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y
Note: Table 2.15 presents the results of a linear model with the log of craft beer
production (in hundreds of barrels) plus one as the dependent variable in columns (1)-
(4). Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level are in parenthesis where *, **,
*** denote significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 2.16: Lagged VR Treatment Variables, impact on production
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ExTerr 0.446 0.811 0.453 0.840*
(0.36) (0.49) (0.36) (0.49)
Fran -0.656** -0.887*** -0.670** -0.908***
(0.26) (0.32) (0.26) (0.32)
TwoT ier × ExTerr -0.844 -0.884
(0.62) (0.62)
TwoT ier × Fran 0.558 0.573
(0.50) (0.50)
ExTerr (5 year lag) -0.196 -0.134 -0.180 -0.119
(0.33) (0.50) (0.33) (0.50)
Fran (5 year lag) -0.066 -0.114 -0.059 -0.096
(0.29) (0.43) (0.28) (0.43)
TwoT ier × ExTerr (5 year lag) -0.347 -0.341
(0.55) (0.54)
TwoT ier × Fran (5 year lag) 0.103 0.082
(0.42) (0.42)
ln Neighboring Breweries/cap 0.082 0.135
(0.29) (0.30)
ln Neighboring Prod 0.093 0.098
(0.23) (0.23)
ln %20 year+ Pop -2.506 -2.391 -1.519 -1.434
(5.49) (5.54) (5.67) (5.76)
ln Pop 1.867 2.043 2.069 2.250
(1.26) (1.28) (1.52) (1.55)
ln Real Tax/bbl -1.338** -1.281** -1.291** -1.240*
(0.62) (0.61) (0.64) (0.64)
ln Real GDP/cap -1.170 -1.184 -1.284 -1.294
(0.71) (0.71) (0.84) (0.84)
ln Unemployment -0.271 -0.232 -0.275 -0.235
(0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28)
ln %Black Pop -0.217 -0.221 -0.262 -0.280
(0.36) (0.35) (0.37) (0.36)
ln Beer/cap -3.326** -3.279** -3.378** -3.323**
(1.38) (1.37) (1.34) (1.34)
ln Wine/cap 0.655 0.750 0.670 0.770
(0.67) (0.66) (0.66) (0.66)
ln Spirit/cap 0.642 0.804 0.658 0.802
(1.00) (1.01) (1.06) (1.06)
State & Year FE Y Y Y Y
R2 0.872 0.873 0.873 0.874
N 1479 1479 1479 1479
Note: Table 2.16 presents the results of a linear model with the log of craft beer
production (in hundreds of barrels) plus one as the dependent variable in columns (1)-
(4). Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level are in parenthesis where *, **,
*** denote significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 2.17: Lagged VR Treatment Variables, Franchise and Ex. Terr Separate Regressions
Panel (a) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Fran -0.413* -0.426 -0.424* -0.438
(0.24) (0.31) (0.24) (0.31)
TwoT ier × Fran 0.034 0.036
(0.42) (0.41)
Fran (5 year lag) -0.175 -0.167 -0.163 -0.154
(0.28) (0.37) (0.28) (0.38)
TwoT ier × Fran (5 year lag) -0.022 -0.029
(0.40) (0.41)
ln Neighboring Breweries/cap 0.046 0.046
(0.29) (0.30)
ln Neighboring Prod 0.091 0.091
(0.23) (0.23)
Panel (b) (1) (2) (3) (4)
ExTerr -0.016 0.178 -0.012 0.204
(0.34) (0.48) (0.35) (0.48)
TwoT ier × ExTerr -0.429 -0.465
(0.58) (0.57)
ExTerr (5 year lag) -0.175 -0.153 -0.152 -0.119
(0.31) (0.44) (0.32) (0.44)
TwoT ier × ExTerr (5 year lag) -0.267 -0.287
(0.49) (0.49)
ln Neighboring Breweries/cap 0.117 0.191
(0.29) (0.30)
ln Neighboring Prod 0.054 0.049
(0.23) (0.23)
State & Year FE Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y
Note: Table 2.17 presents the results of a linear model with the log of craft beer
production (in hundreds of barrels) plus one as the dependent variable in columns (1)-
(4). Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level are in parenthesis where *, **,
*** denote significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 2.18: Impact of TwoT ier on Entry, Cross Sectional Regression, 1984
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TwoT ier 0.182* 0.246 0.168 0.266*
(0.11) (0.15) (0.11) (0.15)
ExTerr 0.129 0.100 0.138 0.093
(0.09) (0.12) (0.09) (0.11)
Fran -0.093 -0.034 -0.074 0.027
(0.09) (0.12) (0.09) (0.12)
TwoT ier × ExTerr 0.099 0.164
(0.20) (0.20)
TwoT ier × Fran -0.160 -0.258
(0.19) (0.20)
Neighboring Breweries/cap -0.295 -0.383*
(0.21) (0.23)
%20 year+ Pop -0.020 -0.020 -0.021 -0.021
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Real Tax/bbl -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Real GDP/cap -0.009** -0.009** -0.006 -0.006
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Unemployment 0.015 0.014 0.021 0.023
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
%Black Pop 0.001 0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Beer/cap 0.031** 0.029** 0.028** 0.024*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Wine/cap -0.002 -0.019 0.005 -0.020
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Spirits/cap 0.066 0.088 0.070 0.108
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Constant 0.752 0.748 0.770 0.766
(1.27) (1.30) (1.25) (1.27)
R2 0.382 0.394 0.412 0.439
N 51 51 51 51
Note: Table 2.18 presents the results of a linear model with the number of breweries
per million people as the dependent variable in columns (1)-(4). Standard errors are in
parenthesis where *, **, *** denote significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 2.19: Impact of TwoT ier on Entry, Cross Sectional Regression, 2013-1984
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TwoT ier 8.818** 6.802 8.698** 7.011*
(3.62) (4.34) (3.44) (4.14)
∆ ExTerr 3.665 3.675 4.694 4.244
(4.41) (5.38) (4.22) (5.15)
∆ Fran -3.095 -5.936 -1.354 -3.412
(4.43) (5.59) (4.28) (5.46)
∆ TwoT ier × ExTerr -0.187 1.243
(9.74) (9.32)
∆ TwoT ier × Fran 7.555 5.168
(9.39) (9.03)
∆Neighboring Breweries/cap 0.559** 0.542**
(0.25) (0.25)
∆%20 year+ Pop 5.596*** 5.680*** 4.793*** 4.884***
(1.18) (1.20) (1.18) (1.20)
∆Real Tax/bbl 0.437* 0.438* 0.160 0.169
(0.23) (0.23) (0.25) (0.25)
∆Real GDP/cap 0.028 -0.003 0.111 0.085
(0.20) (0.21) (0.20) (0.20)
∆Unemployment 1.921* 1.919* 1.709 1.701
(1.07) (1.09) (1.02) (1.04)
∆%Black Pop -1.001 -1.049 -0.679 -0.717
(0.80) (0.81) (0.77) (0.79)
∆Beer/cap 0.604 0.646 0.566 0.599
(0.56) (0.57) (0.54) (0.55)
∆Wine/cap 2.601 2.643 2.973 3.010
(3.78) (3.83) (3.59) (3.66)
∆Spirits/cap -0.345 -0.122 -1.549 -1.388
(2.07) (2.14) (2.03) (2.12)
Constant -44.360*** -43.760** -49.454*** -48.854***
(16.33) (16.58) (15.69) (16.00)
R2 0.544 0.554 0.598 0.605
N 51 51 51 51
Note: Table 2.19 presents the results of a linear model with the change in breweries per mil-
lion people as the dependent variable in columns (1)-(4). Standard errors are in parenthesis
where *, **, *** denote significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 2.20: Impact of TwoT ier on Production, Cross Sectional Regression, 1984
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TwoT ier -0.058 0.586 -0.036 0.589
(0.45) (0.64) (0.46) (0.65)
ExTerr 0.423 0.184 0.409 0.183
(0.40) (0.48) (0.41) (0.49)
Fran -0.464 0.102 -0.494 0.110
(0.39) (0.49) (0.40) (0.52)
TwoT ier × ExTerr 0.833 0.842
(0.82) (0.85)
TwoT ier × Fran -1.502* -1.516*
(0.80) (0.85)
Neighboring Breweries/cap 0.469 -0.053
(0.93) (0.97)
%20 year+ Pop -0.170** -0.168** -0.168** -0.168**
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Pop 0.079** 0.074** 0.080** 0.073*
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Real Tax/bbl -0.005 -0.006 -0.007 -0.006
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Real GDP/cap 0.005 0.005 0.001 0.005
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Unemployment 0.009 0.008 -0.002 0.009
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
%Black Pop -0.024 -0.017 -0.018 -0.018
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Beer/cap -0.022 -0.040 -0.018 -0.041
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
Wine/cap 1.123*** 0.979*** 1.109*** 0.979***
(0.30) (0.31) (0.31) (0.31)
Spirits/cap -0.961* -0.780 -0.962* -0.778
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.51)
Constant 11.043** 11.020** 11.033* 11.020*
(5.43) (5.36) (5.49) (5.43)
R2 0.540 0.582 0.544 0.582
N 51 51 51 51
Note: Table 2.20 presents the results of a linear model with the log of craft beer
production in hundreds of barrels plus one as the dependent variable in columns (1)-
(4). Standard errors are in parenthesis where *, **, *** denote significant at 10%, 5%,
and 1% levels, respectively.
55
Table 2.21: Impact of TwoT ier on Production, Cross Sectional Regression, 2012-1984
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TwoT ier 1.246** 1.042* 1.255** 1.023*
(0.51) (0.61) (0.51) (0.60)
∆ ExTerr -0.079 0.198 -0.158 0.142
(0.63) (0.78) (0.63) (0.77)
∆ Fran -0.208 -0.737 -0.335 -0.954
(0.63) (0.78) (0.63) (0.80)
∆ TwoT ier × ExTerr -0.911 -1.025
(1.40) (1.39)
∆ TwoT ier × Fran 1.508 1.713
(1.32) (1.32)
∆Neighboring Breweries/cap -0.041 -0.047
(0.04) (0.04)
∆%20 year+ Pop 0.178 0.187 0.238 0.257
(0.17) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18)
∆Pop 0.248** 0.243** 0.252** 0.247**
(0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12)
∆Real Tax/bbl 0.018 0.018 0.038 0.042
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
∆Real GDP/cap -0.007 -0.012 -0.013 -0.020
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
∆Unemployment 0.091 0.100 0.107 0.119
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
∆%Black Pop 0.094 0.081 0.071 0.053
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12)
∆Beer/cap -0.164* -0.158* -0.160* -0.153*
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
∆Wine/cap 0.159 0.150 0.137 0.123
(0.55) (0.56) (0.55) (0.55)
∆Spirits/cap 0.257 0.319 0.346 0.429
(0.29) (0.30) (0.30) (0.31)
Constant -1.112 -0.984 -0.761 -0.566
(2.40) (2.43) (2.41) (2.43)
R2 0.477 0.496 0.495 0.518
N 51 51 51 51
Note: Table 2.21 presents the results of a linear model with the log of the change in craft beer
production as the dependent variable in columns (1)-(4). Standard errors are in parenthesis
where *, **, *** denote significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Figure 2.1: Number of Permitted Breweries in US (1984-2013)
Source: TTB
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(a) Entry per capita in Twotier = 1 states
(b) Entry per capita in Twotier = 0 states
Figure 2.2: Net brewery entry per million people by year
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(a) Breweries per capita by TwoT ier (b) Entrants per capita by TwoT ier
(c) Breweries per capita by Fran (d) Entrants per capita by Fran
(e) Breweries per capita by ExTerr (f) Entrants per capita by ExTerr
Figure 2.3: Number of Breweries and Entrants per Capita by Policy
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(a) Craft beer production by TwoT ier
(b) Craft beer production by Fran
(c) Craft beer production by ExTerr
Figure 2.4: Craft Beer Production by Policy
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(a) TwoT ier on breweries per capita
(b) TwoT ier on craft beer production per capita




and Beer Franchise Laws: Evidence
from scanner level data
3.1 Introduction
There are conflicting theories on the impact of vertical restraints as to whether
they act as efficiency enhancing or anti-competitive. Theoretical literature on the subject is
mixed,1 so empirical work is key. This paper exploits the implementation of two laws by the
state of Wisconsin that mandated vertical restraints in the brewing industry, and examines
the impact these two policies had on prices and quantities. In May of 2004, Wisconsin
enacted beer franchise laws which legally restricts when a brewer can cancel, terminate, or
fail to renew a wholesale contract with a beer distributor. Subsequently in January of 2006,
Wisconsin enacted mandated exclusive territories which required all brewers to designate an
exclusive wholesale territory for their distributors. Since the impact of these policies may
be different in different niches of the market (large, domestic breweries compared to import
or craft breweries, for example), I allow the impact to differ across categories of breweries.
1See Rey and Verge (2008) for a summary of theoretical work on vertical restraints.
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I find that prices increase significantly for smaller craft brewers and lend support to anti-
competitive effects of the laws.
Franchise laws place restrictions on when a franchisor can terminate a contract with
a franchisee. Although the relationship between brewers and wholesalers is not treated as a
traditional franchise in most states, beginning in the 1970s, states began to pass franchise
laws specifically in the beer industry. Similar to traditional franchise laws these laws restrict
when brewers can terminate, cancel, or fail to renew a contract with a wholesaler. The
impact of these laws is analogous to traditional franchise laws. The theoretical effects of
franchise laws are ambiguous (see Brickley, Dark, Weisbach, (1991), and Klein (1995), e.g.).
These laws have been justified for giving beer wholesalers the security to be willing to
invest effort into selling a brand without fear of the future benefit of that effort going to
another wholesaler. On the other hand, franchise laws also have the potential to serve as
a mechanism for agency problems and for rents to be accrued to the wholesalers, as once a
contract is signed, it can be very costly to terminate a contract even if the wholesaler is not
acting in line with the brewer’s interest. This could decrease competition among wholesalers,
raise the cost of distribution and ultimately raise the final price of beer. Further, if this
effect is asymmetric across market segments, it could reduce the incentive to compete on
prices for the less affected segment and weaken competition between brewers.
The voluntary use of and mandates to use exclusive territories also have seen mixed
theoretical and empirical studies. Theoretically, the voluntary use of exclusive territories
may have anticompetitive effects, such as reducing competition (Stiglitz and Rey, 1995)
or preventing entry (Asker and Bar-Isaac, 2014). On the other hand, alternative lines of
thought argue that they may be used to alleviate agency problems (Klein and Murphy,
1988). Many brewers use exclusive territories voluntarily, even where not mandated. How-
ever, the benefit of granting exclusive territories may be diminished if the threat of finding
an alternative wholesaler is not present, as it is absent or at least diminished when beer
franchise laws are also enforced.
This study seeks to extend investigation of these restrictions by exploiting the quasi-
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experiment caused by the franchise and exclusive territory legislation from Wisconsin. Ex-
isting studies have examined some of the effects of these laws in the brewing industry.
Burgdorf (2016) finds beer franchise laws and mandated exclusive territories reduced brew-
ery entry and production. Sass and Saurman (1993, 1996) and Rojas (2013) argue that the
ability to use exclusive territories are welfare improving and mandates allowed brewers to
do so without fear of litigation. However, these studies span time periods when anti-trust
treatment of vertical restraints was more restrictive. The effects of mandates may be dif-
ferent in more recent times since the use of exclusive territories seems unlikely to attract
attention from antitrust authorities (see Federal Trade Commission, 2005). Secondly, the
brewing industry has changed drastically since the time period of these studies. According
to the Brewer’s Association, the brewing industry in 2014 had a 19.3% craft brewery share
of revenue and 11% share of volume, whereas in 2005 craft beer made up 4.7% of revenue
and 3.1% of volume. Earlier years saw an even smaller craft share. This study will be able
to take into account this segment of the market and will allow estimated effects to differ by
types of beer brands.
Using a difference in differences design I find that franchise laws increased prices
of craft beer by 2.4-3.5% and the subsequent passage of mandated exclusive territories
increased prices by a further 3.4-4.0%. These findings are robust across several control
groups2 and a data driven synthetic control method. Impacts on quantities sold are not
found to be robust and consistent across all control groups, as with price effects on other
brand categories. One issue is the measure of quantity, average store level sales, does
not represent total sales in states, and may not account for unobserved heterogeneity well
using this methodology. Arguably, surrounding states would account for local geographical
demand and supply shocks better than other, wider control groups, and these controls
find overall beer quantity sold decreased. The increase in prices for smaller, craft brewers
indicates an increase in the cost of distribution. A small empirical literature across several
industries tends to find beneficial welfare impacts of the voluntary use of vertical restraints
2The control groups used are states in close geographic proximity to Wisconsin, states that do not
mandate exclusive territories, and all states in the dataset. See section 4 for more details.
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and negative impacts when they are mandated (see Slade and Lafontaine, 2008, and Cooper,
et al., 2005 for two relatively recent surveys of the literature). These findings add to this
empirical literature.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section will discuss the beer
industry and specific legislation at hand, and explore some more of the theoretical and
empirical findings associated with these policies. Section 3 presents the data used in this
study. Section 4 details the main empirical research design and section 5 discusses the
results and robustness checks. Finally, section 6 concludes and discusses the contributions
of this paper.
3.2 Background and law changes
The brewing industry is highly regulated, and much regulation is directed towards
the vertical supply chain of the industry. The supply chain in the brewing industry is
colloquially called the “three-tier system” consisting of brewers, wholesalers, and retailers.
Under the strictest enforcement of this system, each tier must be independently owned
and operated, and integration between tiers is not allowed. While no states allow brewers
to integrate with retailers (with the exception of brew pubs in all states and on-brewery-
premise sales or direct shipments in some states) some states allow integration between
brewers and wholesalers.3 Over the time period of this study, Wisconsin allowed all brewers
to distribute their beer to retailers.4 This option is not available in all states. One would
expect to find larger effects in states where a brewer is prohibited from distributing its own
beer to retailers.
The brewing industry is also characterized by high levels of concentration (see Trem-
blay, Iwasaki, and Tremblay, 2005; and Tremblay and Tremblay, 2005). The first states to
mandate exclusive territories and pass beer franchise laws did so as concentration was in-
3Many states have also passed small brewery exceptions to their prohibitions of integration, allowing
breweries under certain production levels to sell directly to retailers.
4This was amended in 2011 Wisconsin Act 32, which removed the ability of brewers to hold wholesale
licenses. Small brewers were still allowed to sell and distribute beer to retailers.
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creasing in response to wholesaler concerns that large brewers would act anti-competitively
and harm wholesaler interests. Since then the craft brewing industry has emerged and al-
though these brewers are far smaller in scale than large, national brewers, exclusive territory
laws and beer franchise laws apply to them equally.
3.2.1 Franchise Laws
Beer franchise laws, which are currently present in almost all states (see Burgdorf,
2016), restrict when a brewer can cancel, terminate, or fail to renew a contract with a
wholesaler. This restriction is similar to traditional franchise laws.5 Beer franchise laws
were passed in Wisconsin with the 2003 Wisconsin Act 303, effective May 5, 2004.6 Under
this law if a contract with a wholesaler is “terminated, cancelled, or failed to renew” the law
requires the terminated wholesaler to be compensated by the amount of the “fair market
value” of the distribution rights of beer brand. There are a few provisions under which a
wholesaler would not be required to be compensated for a termination or failure to renew a
contract. They are not very broad provisions, as the wholesaler is not due compensation only
if the wholesaler committed fraud, sold beer outside a designated territory, went bankrupt,
or was convicted of a felony.
Unlike many states’ beer franchise laws, Wisconsin’s laws do not completely prohibit
termination of contracts without cause, but requires compensation to the wholesaler if the
contract is terminated for reasons other than the four listed above. This provision makes
Wisconsin’s beer franchise laws more lenient than other states. Most states do not allow for
any termination outside of legal “good cause,” which is usually defined similarly to the four
provisions above. In fact, North Carolina and New York have recently passed exceptions
to their beer franchise laws which allow small brewers to compensate wholesalers when
terminating a contract; thus these exceptions which relaxed the law still only put them on
par with Wisconsin’s legislation.




Prior to the 2003 Act, Wisconsin beer wholesalers were protected in some cases
under the Wisconsin Fair Dealership Law (FDL). This act requires good cause to cancel
any franchise in which there is a “community of interest” defined as “a continuing financial
interest between the grantor and grantee in either the operation of the dealership business
or the marketing of such goods or services.7” This law applied to franchises as well as other
industries, but in the beer industry only applied to brands that made up a substantial
portion of a wholesaler’s business. Aside from a few brands and brewers, the FDL would
not cover most brands.8
As discussed above, the theoretical impact of franchise termination laws are ambigu-
ous. Brickley et al. (1991) formally models the ambiguous effects of franchise termination
laws and empirically finds franchise laws reduced stock returns of franchise companies.9
Broadly speaking, this stems from potentially misaligned incentives between brewers and
wholesalers. Franchise laws would increase a wholesaler’s incentive to shirk on investment
into quality control of storage or promotional activities since the law makes it more costly
to terminate a shirking wholesaler. In this case, franchise laws would increase shirking and
raise the effective cost of distribution and prices. Alternatively, the brewer may have incen-
tives threaten termination for anti-competitive reasons (for distributing another brewer’s
product for example), in which case franchise laws may increase competition.
3.2.2 Mandated Exclusive Territories
Exclusive territories for beer wholesalers were mandated by law in Wisconsin with
the passage of 2005 Wisconsin Act 103 (Assembly Bill 787). This legislation requires brewers
to give wholesalers an exclusive wholesale territory in which no other wholesaler can legally
sell the contracted brands to retailers.
7Wisconsin Statutes 135.025: http://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/1995/statutes/statutes/135.pdf
8According to a statement filed in support of the legislation by the Wisconsin Beer Wholesaler’s
Association, the brand would need to comprise at least approximately 15% of distributor’s business
before the FDL would apply. This, from the same statement, would only cover a few very large
brands, and not even brands like Corona, the largest volume imported brand in the U.S. Available here:
https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/2003/proposals/sb489
9Other studies examine franchise laws: Klick et al. (2012) finds a reduction in franchising activities from
franchise laws, and Smith II (1982) finds an increase in automobile dealerships.
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The legislation was passed partly in response to the US Supreme Court ruling of
Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005), in anticipation of potential Constitutional conflicts
with how beer wholesaling laws stood at the time of the ruling.10 The law became effective
January 21, 2006 for new contracts, and August 1, 2006 for existing wholesalers, 11 and the
effects of the law appear in the data in January 2006.
There have been a handful of studies examining the impact of mandated exclusive
territories in the brewing industry. Sass and Saurman (1993) use price proxies and quan-
tity data and find these mandates increased demand and decreased supply resulting in no
quantity impact and increase in price. Sass and Saurman (1996) examine the exclusive
territory ban in Indiana (which lasted from 1979-2002) and find the ban reduced sales.
Similarly Rojas (2012) found that when Arkansas implemented mandated exclusive terri-
tories in 1991, quantities rose dramatically, and no significant impact on price was found.12
Both Sass and Saurman (1993) and Rojas (2012) argue that these laws allowed breweries
to use exclusive territories when they otherwise would not have for fear of legislation. This
study can extend upon and address some considerations that the previous studies were not
able to address. First, the previous studies cover time periods when the voluntary use of
exclusive territories was viewed more suspiciously than the time period of this study, and
although breweries often use exclusive territories voluntarily (see Klein and Murphy, 1988),
they risked being sued.13 During the timeframe of this study, voluntary use of exclusive
10Before this law was passed Wisconsin had different standards for breweries located instate and those
located out of state. This may have been unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause given the ruling
in Granholm v. Heald, which found that allowing instate wineries to ship directly to residents, but not
out of state wineries was unconstitutional. Additionally, there was concern over “big-box” stores becoming
more active in distribution and shipping. As stated in material submitted in support of the legislation,
“‘Designated territories’ are designed to prevent big-box mega retailers from becoming the de facto middle-
tier of the three-tier system, destroying our independent beer distributors, hurting Wisconsin’s craft brewers
and increasing costs for taverns, convenience stores and the thousands of other small retailers in Wisconsin.”
(Accessible here: https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/2005/proposals/ab787).
11Section 10 of the act reads: “This act first applies on the first day of the 7th month beginning after
the effective date of this subsection with respect to any person holding a wholesaler’s license issued under
section 125.28 of the statutes immediately prior to the effective date of this subsection.”
12Unfortunately, the same legislation that mandated exclusive territories in Arkansas also included beer
franchise laws. It is unclear the full effect of his findings can be ascribed to exclusive territories therefore.
This study has the advantage of franchise laws being passed separately from mandated exclusive territories.
13See for example, Adolph Coors Co. v. FTC, 497 F.2d 1178 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1105 (1975)
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territories was less likely to result in antitrust litigation,14 so mandates may have different
effects in this different legal environment. Secondly, the previous studies covered time pe-
riods where craft brewing was an extraordinarily small part of the market. This study will
contribute differential effects depending on the types of brewers.
3.3 Data
The data used in this paper consist of scanner data provided by IRI from a large
number of chain grocery stores.15 IRI collects data on sales volume and quantities from bar
code scanners from a large number of stores in nearly every state. The data span from 2001
to 2011 and provide detailed store-sales level data on a large number of product categories.
The unit of observation in the original data is at the store-weekly-UPC sales level. The
stores are categorized as belonging to one of 50 distinct geographical markets defined by
IRI, which corresponds to a geographic region. Store location is important for this study.
Usually, a market is within a single state, but for cases when it is not (the market of St.
Louis contains stores in both Missouri and Illinois, for example), I have store location up
to zip code. The data also include an estimate of annualized sales across all products sold
in millions for the store. For more details about the IRI dataset, see Bronnenberg, et al.
(2008).
For the purposes of this study, the data were aggregated monthly and across all
UPCs of beer sales within a store so the unit of observation is a store-month. Total quantity
of beer sold is calculated along with the average price paid, separated by “types” of beer.
These “types” consist of five categories: all beer products in total, domestic non-craft
brands (simply referred to as domestic in the following discussions—this captures any brand
that was not imported but was not classified as “craft”), imported beer brands, craft beer
brands,16 and in-state craft brewers (brands by breweries located within the state the in
14See for example, Federal Trade Commission. (2005). Comment on (California’s) Proposed Beer Fran-
chise Act, August 24, available at www.ftc.gov
15All estimates and analyses in this paper based on Information Resources Inc. data are by the author
and not by IRI.
16The main source used to distinguish craft breweries from non-craft breweries was the Brewer’s Associa-
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which the store is located).
Table 3.1 provides summary statistics on the quantities and prices of beer sold
in stores broken down into five categories: all sales, domestic (non-craft) sales, import
sales, craft sales, and in-state craft brewery sales. The unit of sales is a volume of 72
oz (i.e. one six pack). Estimated total yearly sales of the store in millions of dollars are
reported. The statistics cover only the time period of the study, May 2003 to January
2007, spanning one year before beer franchise laws were implemented and one year after
exclusive territories were mandated (which is a shorter time period than the full IRI data).
The summary statistics are broken down by Wisconsin stores in panel (a) and the three
control groups that will be used: all other states in the IRI data in panel (b), states
that do not mandate exclusive territories in panel (c), and states in close proximity to
Wisconsin—Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, and Michigan17—in panel (d). The samples have distinct
differences. Wisconsin stores uniformly sell more beer overall and domestic brands than all
the control groups, even though average sales of the stores is not always correspondingly
higher. Wisconsin stores sell fewer imported and craft brands in relation to all other states
controls and states that do not mandate exclusive territories, but more than its neighboring
states. Wisconsin also tends to sell more in-state craft brands than the control groups.
Lastly, beer is cheaper in Wisconsin than any of the other controls across all categories.
Figures 1-5 show average store level prices and quantities in Wisconsin grocery stores
and the other control groups that are used in this study showing one year before and one
year after the effective date of beer franchise laws. Figures 6-10 similarly show one year
before and after the mandate of exclusive territories. Prices and quantities are presented
side-by-side, separated by type of beer. The vertical dashed lines represent impositions of
the policies studied in this paper. The vertical line in Figures 1-5 indicates the effective
date of franchise laws, in May of 2004. Mandated exclusive territories are represented by
the next two lines: January 2006 and August 2006. The line corresponding to January
tion (a trade group for craft brewers) membership list:
https://www.brewersassociation.org/membership/member-directories/. Previous published lists were also
used via the Internet Archive ”Wayback Machine:” https://archive.org/web/
17Minnesota is not included due to regulations on beer sales in grocery stores.
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2006 applied to new contracts with wholesalers and in August 2006, all wholesalers must
be assigned an exclusive territory.18
Inspection of Figures 1-10 reveal some interesting findings. First, Wisconsin stores
sell beer on average for a lower price than all other states, with the exception of imported
brands. This is in part driven by the composition of brands consumed in Wisconsin com-
pared to the control groups. However, prices for identical brands tend to be lower generally
as well. For example, over the time period of the study, the average price of a 72oz unit
of Bud Light was $3.85 in Wisconsin stores, whereas the average in all stores excluding
Wisconsin was $4.15. Second, quantity sold have a high degree of correlation across all
control groups, indicating the need to control for monthly demand shocks. Also, average
quantity sold is higher in Wisconsin stores for total beer sales, domestic brands, and craft
breweries located in-state, but Wisconsin stores sell less imported brands, and similar levels
of craft beer.
There are interesting pricing dynamics as well. Two things stand out, both occurring
directly after exclusive territory legislation was enacted: first, there is a temporary price
spike in beer price, driven by large domestic brands. This increase in price is short-lived
and prices return to similar levels of pre-mandated exclusive territories after the legislation
is effective for all contracts. Second, there appears to be permanent price shocks to both
craft brands and craft brands located within Wisconsin. This is most readily apparent on
Figure 9(a). Immediately after exclusive territory legislation is first effective, prices show a
discrete increase in Wisconsin for craft brands. When the legislation takes full effect for all
contracts, another discrete jump in price appears, and unlike the large brewery domestic
brands, this is not temporary. Prices seem to converge to the control group prices, and in
these products, Wisconsin no longer faces lower prices. A similar pattern is seen for the
craft brewers located in Wisconsin in Figure 10(a).
18Section 10 of 2005 Wisconsin Act 103 reads, “This act first applies on the first day of the 7th month
beginning after the effective date of this subsection with respect to any person holding a wholesaler’s license
issued under section 125.28 of the statutes immediately prior to the effective date of this subsection.”
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3.4 Empirical Research Design
To investigate the impacts beer franchise laws and mandated exclusive territories
had a difference in differences approach is used. Regressions are estimated using multiple
control groups as a check on robustness. Specifically, the regressions take the form of
Yjt = βFranjt + δln(Salesjt) + σj + σt + εjt (3.1)
Yjt = βExTerrjt + δln(Salesjt) + σj + σt + εjt (3.2)
where Franjt is a dummy variable equal to 1 if store j is located in Wisconsin post
enactment of beer franchise laws (effective May 5, 2004) at time t and zero otherwise, and
ExTerrjt is a dummy variable equal to 1 if store j is located in Wisconsin post enactment
of mandated exclusive territories (effective January 1, 2006) at time t and zero otherwise.
Salesjt is the estimated annual sales of the store j in millions, and covers all products sold
in the store; σi and σt are store and month fixed effects respectively. εjt is an unobserved
error term. All standard errors in this section’s analysis are clustered at the IRI market
level to allow for serial correlation in the error term within the defined markets. Yjt will
be the log price of beer and the inverse hyperbolic sine19 of quantity of beer sold (this
transformation allows for zero quantity values of beer sales, which occur most frequently













where Pbjt and Qbjt are the price and quantity sold, respectively, in 72oz units of
19The inverse hyperbolic sine function is defined as sinh−1(x) = ln(x+
√
1 + x2). For values not close to
0, this function is approximately equal to ln(2x) = ln(2) + ln(x), so the interpretation of coefficients in a
regression on sinh−1(x) and marginal effects are approximately the same as a natural log, but the hyperbolic
inverse sine is defined at zero. This is necessary as many stores have zero sales of certain types of brands.
See Burbidge, et. al (1988) for more details on this transformation.
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brand b at store j in month t. Bj is the total number of brands in store j. This average is
calculated separately for different categories of “types” of beer: all beer products, domestic
(non-craft) brands, imported brands, craft brands, and craft brands that are located within
the same state as the store it is sold.
The further from the policy enactment dates the more difficult it is to control for
other factors that may determine the dependent variables of interest. For this reason the
bandwidth around the time policy is limited, and the entire sample is not used. A bandwidth
of one year before and after the month of franchise termination laws and then exclusive
territories were implemented is used and the regressions omit the month the law went into
effect.
There are three markets as defined by IRI in Wisconsin: Eau Claire, Green Bay, and
Milwaukee. Identifying which set of other stores are best to use as control groups for these
is not immediately obvious. The preferred control group in this paper will be one that limits
the sample of stores included to only those in markets in close proximity to Wisconsin. This
group will control for local, geographic supply and demand shocks that do not occur at a
national level better than a wider, less restrictive sample. The first control group thus will
consist only of stores located in states in close proximity to Wisconsin (Illinois, Michigan,
Indiana and Iowa). This consists of 10 IRI defined markets.20
An alternative argument could be to use as broad of a sample as possible or states
that have similar regulations. To approach this problem, I will use two alternative control
groups. The findings should be considered more robust if they do not vary much across
control groups. The second control group will be constructed using all stores from 47
IRI markets in the sample.21 Certain states are excluded due to beer sales laws.22 As
another robustness check, only stores located in states in which exclusive territories are not
mandated (22 IRI markets) will be used.23
20The markets are Chicago, Detroit, Grand Rapids, Indianapolis, Peoria/Springfield, Spokane and St.
Louis (only stores that are in Illinois).
21See Appendix A for a listing of all included IRI markets
22Markets in Minnesota, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey were not included due to state sales laws, or
restrictions on retail store ownership.




Results of estimating equation (1), the impact of franchise laws, are presented first.
Table 3.2 presents results on prices and Table 3.3 presents results on quantities. For both
tables Panel (a) uses stores from states in close geographical proximity to Wisconsin as a
control group, Panel (b) uses stores from all IRI markets in the sample as a control group,
and Panel (c) uses only stores in states that do not mandate exclusive territories as a control
group.
When using only the surrounding state control in Table 3.2 Panel (a), the estimated
effect on price for all brands, domestic brands, and imported brands is small and all are
statistically insignificant. Craft beer and in-state craft brands are estimated to have a
sizeable price increase of 3.40% and 3.34% respectively.24 The in-state price increase is not
statistically significant, but craft brands are significant at the 5% level.
When using all markets as a control in Table 3.2 Panel (b), we find inconsistent
results for columns (1)-(3) as the average price of all beer, domestic brands, and imported
brands are estimated to fall by approximately 2.01%, 2.43% and 0.999%, respectively. In
fact, the sign of the price effect flips on imported brands in column (3), Despite these
inconsistent results in columns (1)-(3), craft beer prices in column (4) are estimated to
increase by 2.34% and in-state brands increase by 2.96%, the former is significant at the
10% level and the latter is not statistically significant. Using states that did not mandate
exclusive territories as a control group in Panel (c), results are similar.
It could be argued that surrounding states is the most appropriate control group, as
this may more readily account for any exogenous geographical demand or supply shocks that
Philadelphia, Phoenix, Pittsfield, Portland, OR, Sacramento, Salt Lake City, San Diego, San Francisco,
Seattle/Tacoma, Spokane, Syracuse, Washington DC, and West Texas/New Mexico. This is a natural
seeming benchmark for the study on exclusive territories. Using states that did not have beer franchise laws
would be ideal for the franchise law study, but unfortunately, this leaves too few markets since nearly every
state has beer franchise laws.
24Precisely, the marginal effect of the coefficient β, is calculated exp(β)− 1, which is approximately equal
to β for small values. Since all coefficient estimates are small, the results presented here will treat the
coefficients as the marginal effects.
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may have occurred as franchise laws were implemented, so this casts doubt on any causal
effects that can be attributed to the price decreases found for non-craft brands. Secondly,
it would be surprising to find an effect on the large domestic brands which may have fallen
under the Wisconsin FDL already, as mentioned above, as they would face no change in
the law’s effects. Craft brands however, are consistently estimated to have increased prices
across all control groups. If regional demand or supply shocks drove the results in Panel
(b) and (c), these effects should be not be present in Panel (a) where only proximate states
are included as the control. The price increase is estimated to be largest in Panel (a), so I
find the opposite. Here we find craft prices increase and no significant effect (statistically
or economically) on other brands.
Quantity effects are examined using surrounding states as a control in Panel (a) of
Table 3.3. Overall, domestic, and imported quantities are estimated to fall by 4.43%, 4.63%
and 3.60%, respectively. The coefficient on craft is positive but imprecise (the standard
error is over twice the size of the coefficient). The estimated coefficient on in-state brands is
negative but also statistically insignificant. Using all markets as a control group in Panel (b)
finds significant and relatively large effects on the average quantity of craft beer and in-state
brands. The coefficients are 0.0960, significant at the 5% level, and 0.0643 significant at the
1% level respectively. Positive, but insignificant, effects are found for other categorizations.
When using markets that do not mandate exclusive territories in Panel (c), the quantity
increase on craft brands is no longer significant and is less than half the size as Panel (b).
Instate brands are estimated to increase quantity by 6.67%, significant at th 5% level. Other
categories are similar and none are estimated to be significant. Hence, quantity results are
not robust across control groups. As above, this casts doubt on findings of an increase
in sales for craft and in-state brands due to franchise laws. An alternative explanation is
that a regional increase in craft an in-state brand sales coincided around the time-frame
considered.
The only results from the franchise law study that are robust across all control group
specifications is that of craft beer prices. These prices are estimated to have increased by
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approximately 2.34-3.40%, and while the results for in-state brands were not statistically
significant, the estimates were of similar magnitude.
3.5.2 Exclusive Territories
Results from equation (2) estimate the impact of mandated exclusive territories.
Table 3.4 presents results on prices and Table 3.5 presents results on quantities. As above,
Panel (a) uses all IRI markets in the sample as a control group, Panel (b) uses only states
that do not mandate exclusive territories as a control group, and Panel (c) uses states in
close geographical proximity to Wisconsin as a control group.
Table 3.4 present price effect estimates of mandated exclusive territories. In Panel
(a) using surrounding states as a control, mandated exclusive territories are estiamted to
increase overall and domestic brand prices by 1.51% and 1.43%, respectively. Craft and
in-state brand prices are estimated increase by 3.92% and 5.58%, respectively. This can be
readily seen in Figure 3.9(b) and 3.10(b), where immediately after exclusive territories are
mandated a discrete jump occurs in prices.
In Panel (b) and (c), only craft and in-state brands are estimated to have significant
price effects. Craft brands are estimated to increase by approximately 3.31% in Panel (b)
and 3.80% in Panel (c). In-state brands are estimated to increase by 5.56% in Panel (b)
and 5.58% in Panel (c), all significant at the 1% level. Average beer prices over all brands,
domestic and imported brands are all estimated to have statistically and economically in-
significant price effects (< 1% in absolute value) in Panel (b) and (c). Again, it can be
argued that the surrounding states may in fact be the appropriate control group as it would
better control for geographical shocks than a larger or more dispersed group, and is the
preferred control group. However, the price effects are only robust across all groups for
craft and in-state brands.
The finding that mandated exclusive territories when beer franchise laws are present
further increases prices suggests that this mandate raises the costs of distribution. Further,
the finding that this price increase was larger for craft brewers and larger still for craft
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brewers located in Wisconsin25 suggests that the effects are asymmetric across firms. Thus,
these laws not only weaken competition among wholesalers but may be weakening compe-
tition among brewers, as it would reduce incentives for large brewers to reduce their prices
to compete with the expanding craft brewing market.
Table 3.5 presents the impact of mandated exclusive territories on average store level
quantities sold. In Panel (a) using surrounding states as the control group, the impact of
mandated exclusive territories is estimated to be negative (ranging from -1.8% to -2.7%) for
all categories except in-state brands, although this is not statistically significant. In panels
(b) and (c), most of the estimated coefficients across the groups are negative (with in-state
brands being an exception, which had economically small, positive coefficients), however
none are statistically significant in these specifications. Further, the standard errors are
relatively large across all control groups, usually being close to the same magnitude of
the coefficient. This specification therefore is not able to detect any significant changes in
average store level sales.
3.5.3 Synthetic control units
As another control group the synthetic control method of Abadie and Gardeazabal
(2003) and Abadie, Diamond, Hainmueller (2010) is used to further test the robustness of the
findings. The synthetic control method proceeds by creating a set of weights on observations
that minimize the distance between pre-treatment observations of characteristics of the
treated state and the potential control states. For this analysis, the observations were
aggregated to the state/month level, so that there is only one treated unit (Wisconsin).
This will also alleviate any concerns of serial correlations between stores or markets that
was may not have been addressed by clustering the standard errors by markets, as the
observation level is now at the state, which is the same level as the policy. Since not all
states had the same number of stores, the observations at which the procedure is performed
25These brewers are more likely to have most, if not all of their sales entirely within Wisconsin than craft
brewers located outside of but shipping in to Wisconsin.
77
upon is given by
P̃st = P̂st − P̄st






















and P̄st and Q̄st are the average values of P̃st and Q̃st, respectively, for the twelve months
preceding the implementation of franchise laws or exclusive territories. Pbjt and Qbjt are
the price and quantity sold, respectively, in 72oz units of brand b at store j in state s at
month t. Js is the total number of stores in state s, and Bj is the total number of brands in
store j. In words, P̃st and Q̃st are the demeaned average store level price and quantity of
beer at the state level. So for example, a value of P̃st = 0 would indicate that the average
store level price of beer in state s at time t was equal to the average store level price over
the year preceding the policy change.
The synthetic control method was implemented using the synth package in Stata,
minimizing the distance between demeaned pre-treatment log prices, P̃st, for the price
analysis and minimizing the distance between demeaned pre-treatment sinh−1 quantities,
Q̃st, for the quantity analysis, for each group. These weighted units were then applied
to the post treatment periods and regressions were ran using 12 months before the treat-
ment month and 12 months after the treatment month. The regression analysis is again a
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difference-in-differences model
Yst = βFranst + σs + σt + εst (3.3)
Yst = βExTerrst + σs + σt + εst (3.4)
where the notation is similar to equation (1) and (2). Yst will take the value of
either P̃st or Q̃st.
Results are presented in Tables 3.6 and 3.7.26 The price results are qualitatively
similar to the previous control groups for the effect of mandated exclusive territories and
franchise laws: craft beer prices increased, and the craft brewers located within Wisconsin
increased prices by more. Similar to the surrounding state control group from Panel (a) in
Table 3.4, prices overall and domestic prices are estimated to have increased as a result of
exclusive territories, but this was likely a temporary increase, as the graphs in Figures 3.6
and 3.7 show. Quantities are also estimated to have decreased or have economically and
statistically insignificant effects. The results from the synthetic control methods support
the findings from section 5 with regards to the effects of mandating exclusive territories.
For franchise laws, the results are not as intuitive. Quantity results do not accord
with what was found in section 5.1, as across all groups significant quantity increases are
estimated. Inspection of the data from Wisconsin and the constructed synthetic control
units as shown in Appendix B, figures B1-B5, reveal the match is not always a good one,
unlike those of exclusive territories in figures B6-B10. Further, even though quantities
appeared to have increased across all types of beer products, this is in contrast with the
surrounding state control group presented in Table 3.3 which found negative quantity effects.
The synthetic control thus may not be controlling adequately for regional demand and/or
supply shocks, and results should be interpreted with caution.
26Figures B1-B10 show the data for P̃st and Q̃st for Wisconsin and the synthetic control unit.
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3.6 Conclusion
This paper presents evidence on the effects of beer franchise laws and mandated
exclusive territories. Prices of craft beer brands are found to have increased significantly
due to franchise laws and increased even further when exclusive wholesale territories were
mandated. The latter effect was larger for craft breweries located within Wisconsin. These
results are robust across several control groups. This suggests that these laws increased the
costs of distribution, and the asymmetric effects of larger effects on smaller breweries raises
concern that these laws decrease not only wholesaler competition, but competition between
brewers as well. Raising the costs of small brewers reduces the incentives the larger national
brewers have to decrease prices to compete with craft brewers.
Results on quantity of beer sales are not robust and consistent across control groups.
A potential reason for this is that average grocery store level sales does not represent the
main avenue of the quantity effect, or the methodology does not adequately account for
unobserved heterogeneity across stores. To that end, the local control group may do a
better job accounting for geographic demand and supply shocks. This control group found
a decrease in average sales.
The findings of this paper contribute further evidence to a small empirical literature
on mandated vertical restraints. In contrast to previous studies that examined mandated
exclusive territories in the brewing industry (Sass and Saurman, 1993; Rojas, 2012), I find
that the effect is likely anti-competitive and welfare decreasing. A potential reason for this
difference is the time frames of the studies. Previous studies used data from times when
the use of exclusive territories was more likely to attract antitrust litigation, and hence
mandates served as a protection against legal fees, and allowed beneficial voluntary use.
This study used data from a time period when the use of exclusive territories was not likely
to attract litigation, so brewers who found it useful to employ exclusive territories were





(a) Mean Price (b) Mean Quantity
Figure 3.1: Store Level Price and Quantity: all beer
(a) Mean Price (b) Mean Quantity
Figure 3.2: Store Level Price and Quantity: domestic brands
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(a) Mean Price (b) Mean Quantity
Figure 3.3: Store Level Price and Quantity: import brands
(a) Mean Price (b) Mean Quantity
Figure 3.4: Store Level Price and Quantity: craft brands
(a) Mean Price (b) Mean Quantity
Figure 3.5: Store Level Price and Quantity: in-state beer
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Mandated Exclusive Territories
(a) Mean Price (b) Mean Quantity
Figure 3.6: Store Level Price and Quantity: all beer
(a) Mean Price (b) Mean Quantity
Figure 3.7: Store Level Price and Quantity: domestic brands
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(a) Mean Price (b) Mean Quantity
Figure 3.8: Store Level Price and Quantity: import brands
(a) Mean Price (b) Mean Quantity
Figure 3.9: Store Level Price and Quantity: craft brands
(a) Mean Price (b) Mean Quantity




Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. N
Panel (a): Wisconsin Panel (b): Surrounding States
Quantity (all brands) 12928.27 8314.38 1420 10214.08 6733.74 5161
Quantity (domestic brands) 11768.46 7698.47 1420 8555.63 5911.77 5161
Quantity (imported brands) 822.12 655.37 1420 1412.27 1207.97 5161
Quantity (craft brands) 337.23 320.71 1420 245.77 286.48 5161
Quantity (in-state brands) 183.55 192.10 1420 60.48 125.27 5161
Price (all brands) 3.81 0.70 1420 4.20 0.45 5160
Price (domestic brands) 3.55 0.64 1417 3.84 0.35 5157
Price (imported brands) 6.29 0.37 1402 6.10 0.60 5157
Price (craft brands) 6.02 0.57 1327 6.34 0.74 5066
Price (in-state brands) 6.16 0.62 1307 7.20 1.15 3292
Annual store sales 26.61 13.66 1420 30.32 17.20 5158
Panel (c): All Other States Panel (d): ExTerr = 0 States
Quantity (all brands) 8003.07 6213.19 53654 7646.37 5722.31 24890
Quantity (domestic brands) 6361.80 5145.61 53654 5597.39 4502.28 24890
Quantity (imported brands) 1256.69 1405.34 53654 1618.99 1632.41 24890
Quantity (craft brands) 384.18 559.33 53654 429.60 508.43 24890
Quantity (in-state brands) 112.80 249.98 53654 140.35 219.04 24890
Price (all brands) 4.43 0.57 53653 4.61 0.61 24889
Price (domestic brands) 4.00 0.38 53440 4.08 0.39 24758
Price (imported brands) 6.36 0.70 50521 6.21 0.79 23321
Price (craft brands) 6.36 0.78 47584 6.36 0.88 21484
Price (in-state brands) 6.73 0.87 30781 6.64 0.80 18021
Annual store sales 23.20 13.12 53650 26.18 13.75 24887




Table 3.2: Beer Franchise Laws: Price regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All Domestic Import Craft In-state
Panel (a): Surrounding states control
Fran -0.00867 -0.0125 0.00673 0.0340∗∗ 0.0334
(0.0106) (0.0102) (0.00602) (0.0135) (0.0248)
ln(Sales) -0.0371∗∗ -0.0488∗∗ -0.0235 -0.0187 -0.140∗∗
(0.0157) (0.0211) (0.0309) (0.0441) (0.0526)
Observations 3484 3484 3470 3360 2364
R2 0.947 0.925 0.890 0.766 0.917
Panel (b): All states control
Fran -0.0201∗∗∗ -0.0243∗∗∗ -0.00999∗∗ 0.0234∗ 0.0296
(0.00655) (0.00522) (0.00464) (0.0126) (0.0221)
ln(Sales) -0.00154 -0.00189 0.00128 0.00157 0.00500
(0.00284) (0.00280) (0.00248) (0.00397) (0.00482)
Observations 28645 28562 27851 26308 16719
R2 0.935 0.910 0.912 0.891 0.833
Panel (c): ExTerr = 0 states control
Fran -0.0257∗∗∗ -0.0284∗∗∗ -0.0161∗∗ 0.0262∗ 0.0265
(0.00660) (0.00538) (0.00617) (0.0128) (0.0225)
ln(Sales) -0.00214 -0.00385 0.00245 0.00389 0.00984
(0.00299) (0.00333) (0.00323) (0.00549) (0.00750)
Observations 11879 11845 11697 10743 9079
R2 0.947 0.908 0.927 0.918 0.812
Note: Table 3.2 shows the results of least squares estimation of equation 3.1, with the
log price as the dependent variable. Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered
by IRI market. Store and month fixed effects are included in each regression.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.3: Beer Franchise Laws: Quantity regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All Domestic Import Craft In-state
Panel (a): Surrounding states control
Fran -0.0443∗∗ -0.0463∗∗ -0.0360∗ 0.0308 -0.0152
(0.0138) (0.0147) (0.0188) (0.0629) (0.0172)
ln(Sales) 0.157∗∗ 0.140∗∗ 0.0947 -0.0463 0.103
(0.0677) (0.0605) (0.167) (0.231) (0.161)
Observations 3485 3485 3485 3485 3485
R2 0.963 0.961 0.965 0.961 0.966
Panel (b): All states control
Fran 0.0142 0.00815 0.0407 0.0960∗∗ 0.0643∗∗∗
(0.0233) (0.0242) (0.0247) (0.0454) (0.0229)
ln(Sales) 0.0184 0.0324 -0.0964 0.0673 -0.0709
(0.0158) (0.0219) (0.0818) (0.0629) (0.0633)
Observations 28646 28646 28646 28646 28646
R2 0.967 0.966 0.966 0.964 0.969
Panel (c): ExTerr = 0 states control
Fran 0.0117 0.00893 0.0420 0.0407 0.0667∗∗
(0.0306) (0.0332) (0.0246) (0.0477) (0.0240)
ln(Sales) 0.0421 0.0630 -0.178 0.00584 -0.133
(0.0251) (0.0378) (0.144) (0.0153) (0.109)
Observations 11879 11879 11879 11879 11879
R2 0.980 0.979 0.972 0.974 0.975
Note: Table 3.3 shows the results of least squares estimation of equation 3.1, with the
inverse hyperbolic sine of quantity as the dependent variable. Standard errors are in
parentheses and clustered by IRI market. Store and month fixed effects are included
in each regression.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
87
Mandated Exclusive Territories
Table 3.4: Mandated Exclusive Territories: Price regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All Domestic Import Craft In-state
Panel (a): Surrounding states control
ExTerr 0.0151∗∗ 0.0143∗∗ 0.00942 0.0392∗∗∗ 0.0506∗∗
(0.00615) (0.00529) (0.00780) (0.0116) (0.0163)
ln(Sales) -0.0169 -0.0132 -0.00873 -0.0455∗ -0.0479
(0.0154) (0.0138) (0.0132) (0.0236) (0.0421)
Observations 3560 3554 3554 3476 2556
R2 0.914 0.876 0.899 0.780 0.873
Panel (b): All states control
ExTerr 0.00165 -0.000613 -0.00114 0.0331∗∗∗ 0.0556∗∗∗
(0.00526) (0.00473) (0.00385) (0.00409) (0.00927)
ln(Sales) -0.0235 -0.0363∗ -0.00708 -0.0104 0.00826
(0.0213) (0.0193) (0.0126) (0.0141) (0.0265)
Observations 27861 27753 27047 25585 17383
R2 0.932 0.909 0.918 0.897 0.828
Panel (c): ExTerr = 0 states control
ExTerr -0.00362 -0.00459 -0.00181 0.0380∗∗∗ 0.0558∗∗∗
(0.00627) (0.00596) (0.00450) (0.00488) (0.0108)
ln(Sales) -0.00847 -0.0231 -0.00729 -0.0180 -0.000181
(0.0242) (0.0215) (0.0160) (0.0123) (0.0242)
Observations 12031 11962 11800 10905 9439
R2 0.930 0.900 0.930 0.926 0.787
Note: Table 3.4 shows the results of least squares estimation of equation 3.2, with the
log price as the dependent variable. Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered
by IRI market. Store and month fixed effects are included in each regression.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.5: Mandated Exclusive Territories: Quantity regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All Domestic Import Craft In-state
Panel (a): Surrounding states control
ExTerr -0.0180 -0.0270 -0.0188 -0.0240 0.0155
(0.0181) (0.0202) (0.0327) (0.0430) (0.0354)
ln(Sales) 0.0865 0.121 0.112∗ 0.413∗∗ 0.159∗∗
(0.0639) (0.0758) (0.0554) (0.133) (0.0556)
Observations 3560 3560 3560 3560 3560
R2 0.970 0.972 0.972 0.960 0.972
Panel (b): All states control
ExTerr -0.00588 -0.0171 -0.0279 0.0479 0.00865
(0.0142) (0.0196) (0.0182) (0.0443) (0.0234)
ln(Sales) 0.0370 -0.0115 0.00651 0.348∗ 0.0292
(0.118) (0.165) (0.153) (0.187) (0.138)
Observations 27861 27861 27861 27861 27861
R2 0.973 0.971 0.969 0.973 0.972
Panel (c): ExTerr = 0 states control
ExTerr -0.0232 -0.0271 -0.0287 0.0297 0.00877
(0.0178) (0.0275) (0.0200) (0.0546) (0.0261)
ln(Sales) -0.0568 -0.153 -0.121 0.195 -0.0750
(0.137) (0.248) (0.234) (0.114) (0.195)
Observations 12031 12031 12031 12031 12031
R2 0.980 0.977 0.970 0.979 0.975
Note: Table 3.5 shows the results of least squares estimation of equation 3.2, with the
inverse hyperbolic sine of quantity as the dependent variable. Standard errors are in
parentheses and clustered by IRI market. Store and month fixed effects are included
in each regression.




Table 3.6: Beer Franchise Laws: Synthetic control regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All Domestic Import Craft In-state
Panel (a): Prices
Fran 0.00771 -0.0170∗∗ -0.00193 0.0124∗ 0.0304∗∗∗
(0.00710) (0.00776) (0.00281) (0.00639) (0.00568)
Observations 48 48 48 48 48
R2 0.787 0.562 0.971 0.774 0.914
Panel (b): Quantities
Fran 0.0452∗ 0.0282∗∗∗ 0.0495∗∗∗ 0.0824∗∗∗ 0.0330∗∗
(0.0231) (0.00462) (0.00650) (0.0168) (0.0119)
Observations 48 48 48 48 48
R2 0.977 0.938 0.963 0.903 0.919
Note: Table 3.7 shows the results of least squares estimation of equation 3.3, with P̃st
and Q̃st as the dependent variables.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Exclusive Territories
Table 3.7: Mandated Exclusive Territories: Synthetic control regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All Domestic Import Craft In-state
Panel (a): Prices
ExTerr 0.0194 0.0315∗ -0.00564 0.0296∗∗∗ 0.0390∗∗∗
(0.0177) (0.0177) (0.00380) (0.00359) (0.00557)
Observations 48 48 48 48 48
R2 0.644 0.648 0.896 0.979 0.964
Panel (b): Quantities
ExTerr -0.0292∗ 0.00355 -0.0265∗∗∗ 0.00574 -0.0207∗∗
(0.0149) (0.0101) (0.00727) (0.0119) (0.00775)
Observations 48 48 48 48 48
R2 0.990 0.786 0.947 0.907 0.948
Note: Table 3.7 shows the results of least squares estimation of equation 3.4, with P̃st
and Q̃st as the dependent variables.





















































Appendix B Synthetic control method graphs
B.1 Franchise Laws
(a) Price (b) Quantity
Figure B1: Mean Wisconsin and synthetic control: all beer
(a) Price (b) Quantity
Figure B2: Mean Wisconsin and synthetic control: domestic beer
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(a) Price (b) Quantity
Figure B3: Mean Wisconsin and synthetic control: imported beer
(a) Price (b) Quantity
Figure B4: Mean Wisconsin and synthetic control: craft beer
(a) Price (b) Quantity
Figure B5: Mean Wisconsin and synthetic control: instate beer
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B.2 Exclusive Territories
(a) Price (b) Quantity
Figure B6: Mean Wisconsin and synthetic control: all beer
(a) Price (b) Quantity
Figure B7: Mean Wisconsin and synthetic control: domestic beer
97
(a) Price (b) Quantity
Figure B8: Mean Wisconsin and synthetic control: imported beer
(a) Price (b) Quantity
Figure B9: Mean Wisconsin and synthetic control: craft beer
(a) Price (b) Quantity
Figure B10: Mean Wisconsin and synthetic control: instate beer
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